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RISING ARIZONA: THE LEGACY OF THE
JIM CROW SOUTHWEST ON
IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY
AFTER 100 YEARS OF STATEHOOD
Kristina M. Campbell
INTRODUCTION
United States immigration law and policy is one the most controversial
issues of our day, and perhaps no location has come under more scrutiny for the way
it has attempted to deal with the problem of undocumented immigration than the
State of Arizona. Though Arizona recently became notorious for its “papers please”
law, SB 1070, the American Southwest has long been a bastion of discriminatory
race-based law and policy – immigration and otherwise – directed toward Latinos,
American Indians, African-Americans, and other non-White racial and ethnic
minorities. While largely ignored by both legal and American historians, the socalled “Jim Crow Southwest” nonetheless persisted throughout the nineteenth and
much of the twentieth century in both the Arizona Territory and the State of Arizona,
forming the basis for, and giving shape to, laws meant to exclude and limit the
participation of non-White persons in Southwestern society.
The State of Arizona, the last of the forty-eight contiguous States to be
admitted to the Union, marked its 100th year of statehood on February 14, 2012. A
few months later, on June 25, 2012, the United States Supreme Court issued its
landmark decision in United States v. Arizona, striking down the majority of
Arizona’s aggressive state immigration enforcement law, S.B. 1070, as preempted by
federal law. This Article discusses recent developments in Arizona immigration law
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and policy. By providing an overview of the history of race-based exclusion laws
and policies in the Arizona Territory and the State of Arizona, it argues that
Arizona’s modern anti-immigrant laws and policies are merely the newest
incarnation of the State’s long history of discriminatory laws against racial and
ethnic minorities, particularly Latinos and American Indians. In attempting to trace
the genesis of racial animus toward non-Whites in the Southwest, Part I provides a
historical overview of the Arizona Territory in the nineteenth century, including the
development of the New Mexico Territory, the Confederate Territory of Arizona,
and the impact of slavery and other race-based discrimination and exclusion laws in
the Southwest. Part II discusses twentieth century race and immigration based
policies in the Jim Crow Southwest that restricted and segregated the civil rights of
non-Whites in the areas of marriage, education, and voting. Part III discusses the
continuing legacy of the Jim Crow Southwest on the development of modern
immigration law and policy in Arizona, and in particular, the aftermath of S.B.
1070’s passage in April 2010, Arizona’s subsequent rise as “ground zero” for state
and local enforcement of immigration law in the United States, and the Supreme
Court’s decisions in United States v. Arizona in 2012 and Arizona v. Inter-Tribal
Council of Arizona in 2013. Finally, the article concludes by summarizing how the
historical evidence presented in this paper rebuts the claim that only in recent years
has Arizona begun to “drown[] in a sea of extremism” 1 and become “the mecca for
prejudice and bigotry,”2 and argues that Arizona has a long history of race-based
exclusion laws and intolerance toward racial and ethnic minorities that has only now
begun to garner attention on the national stage.

I.

RACE-BASED EXCLUSION LAWS IN THE NEW MEXICO AND
ARIZONA TERRITORIES
A. The Compromise of 1850 and Slavery in the Union Territories

The land that ultimately became both the Union and Confederate Territories
of Arizona was originally part of the New Mexico Territory and the Gadsden
Purchase ceded to the United States in 1848 at the conclusion of the MexicanAmerican War.3 The major events that led to the permission of slavery in the New
Mexico (and later, Arizona) Territory were the Compromise of 1850 and the New
Mexico Territory Slave Code.
1.

The Compromise of 1850

The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which ended the war between the United
States and Mexico, was signed on February 2, 1848.4 As part of the treaty, Mexico

1 See Max Blumenthal, Arizona is Drowning in a Sea of Extremism, Alternet (Jan. 13, 2011),
http://www.alternet.org/story/149513/arizona_is_drowning_in_a_sea_of_extremism.
2. See Sheriff Clarence Dupnik: Arizona ‘Mecca for Prejudice and Bigotry, The Huffington
Post
(Jan.
11,
2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/08/sheriff-clarence-dupnika_n_806303.html.
3. See generally Donald S. Frazier, Blood & Treasure: Confederate Empire in the Southwest
(Tex. A&M Univ. Press 1995). See also Fred Veil, Law and Justice in 19th Century Arizona Territory,
Territorial Times, Vol. 1 No. 1, 6 (Fall 2007).
4. See generally Donald S. Frazier, ed., The United States and Mexico at War: Nineteenth
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ceded to the United States a large of portion of present-day California and the
majority of the modern American Southwest. 5 The Mexican Cession included most
of modern-day Arizona, as well as portions of modern Nevada and the western part
of New Mexico.6 The Compromise of 1850 organized this land into the Territory of
New Mexico, with a key provision that slavery be either permitted or prohibited
based on the vote of territorial residents. 7 Although the New Mexico Territory would
not enact its first Slave Code until 1859,8 the agreement to allow or outlaw slavery
via popular vote in the new Southwest territories would have a significant impact on
the development of the region and set the stage for the cessation of the Confederate
Territory of Arizona at the beginning of the Civil War.
2.

The New Mexico Territory Slave Code

Slavery, primarily of American Indians, was in existence in the New
Mexico Territory long before the official enactment of a Slave Code in the
Territory.9 As such, much of the economic growth of the Territory in the 1850s
relied on slave labor.10 Thus, in 1859, the Territorial Legislature enacted the New
Mexico Territory Slave Code, which restricted slave travel, prohibited slaves from
testifying in court, and limited an owners’ right to arm slaves. 11 Because American
Indians American Indians constituted the majority of slaves in the New Mexico
Territory, one of the major goals of the Slave Code was to keep persons of African
descent out of the Territory, American Indians and American Indians thus remained
the predominant group of enslaved persons in the New Mexico Territory. 12
As a result of the decision to permit slavery in the New Mexico Territory,
the United States House of Representatives voted on January 14, 1861, to admit New
Mexico to the Union as a slave state.13 However, a bill on New Mexico statehood
was tabled because of controversy surrounding the extension of slavery into the
Southwest, and the belief that slavery would not be successful in New Mexico. 14
Thus, even though the United States Congress outlawed slavery in all Union
Century Expansionism and Conflict (New York; 1998).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. The Wilmot Proviso would have outlawed slavery in the New Mexico Territory, but was
rejected as part of the Compromise of 1850. See Nancy Gentile Ford, Issues of War and Peace, “The
Three Million Bill and the Wilmot Proviso: The Debate over Westward Expansion during the Mexican
War,” at 75-100 (Greenwood Press, 2002).
8. See Alvin R. Sunseri, Seeds of Discord: New Mexico in the Aftermath of the American
Conquest, 1846-1861 (Nelson-Hall, Inc. 1979); See also Quintard Taylor, In Search of the Racial
Frontier: African Americans in the American West 1528-1990 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1998).
9.
Despite their small numbers, some of the laws concerning slavery in the Territorial
Southwest specifically targeted Blacks. Following the passage of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, slaves of
African descent from Texas had begun to make their way into New Mexico Territory following its
organization. In 1856, in order to discourage fugitive slaves from seeking refuge in the New Mexico, the
Territorial Legislature passed a law limiting the number of free Blacks that were permitted to reside in the
Territory. See Alton Hornsby, Jr., ed., Black America: A State-by-State Historical Encyclopedia, at 551
(Greenwood 2011).
10. Id.
11. Id at 547, 552.
12. See generally Sunseri; Supra note 9.
13. See Spencer C. Tucker, ed., American Civil War: The Definitive Encyclopedia and
Document Collection, at 409 (ABC-CLIO, 2013).
14. Id.
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territories in 1862,15 New Mexico lost its chance at statehood in large part due to its
Slave Code. As a result, New Mexico did not gain admission as a State until January
6, 1912, becoming the 47th State in the Union.16
B. The Confederate Territory of Arizona: 1861-1863
In order to understand the unique culture of Arizona, and the development
of race-based exclusion laws as a means to disenfranchise and discriminate against
non-White persons, it is important to highlight Arizona’s time as part of the
Confederate States of America. The Confederate Territory of Arizona was declared
on August 1, 1861.17 Prior to the beginning of the Civil War, in July 1860, settlers in
Tucson drafted a constitution and attempted to form the Arizona Territory as part of
the United States of America, even electing a territorial Governor and sending a
delegate to the United States Congress.18 However, because of fear that Arizona
would become a slave state if admitted to the Union, 19 Congress did not ratify the
constitutional convention, and the would-be Arizona Territory remained part of the
New Mexico Territory until the ratification of the Arizona Organic Act, which
established Arizona as a separate territory in 1863.20
On March 16, 1861, residents of the southern New Mexico Territory in
Mesilla renewed the call for creation of the Arizona Territory. 21 This time, however,
the proposal to establish the Arizona Territory also called for secession from the
Union, and sought to formally admit Arizona to the Confederate States of America.22
This led in part to the July 1861 Battle of Mesilla in the New Mexico Territory. 23
The Confederate Army prevailed, and on February 14, 1862, Confederate President
Jefferson Davis signed a proclamation recognizing the Confederate Territory of
15. See Hornsby, Jr. at 552.
16. See National Archives, New Mexico and Arizona Statehood Anniversary (1912-2012),
available at http://www.archives.gov/legislative/features/nm-az-statehood/.
17. Prior efforts to establish Arizona as a separate Union Territory were unsuccessful. See
Melissa McDaniel and Wendy Mead, Arizona: Celebrate the State, at 37 (Marshall Cavendish; 2009)
(“The first effort to make Arizona a separate territory came in 1856, when a group of Western New
Mexico Territory residents asked Congress to create the territory of Arizona, but they were
unsuccessful.”).
18. See Late From Arizona: A Provisional Government Convention in Session – Constitution
Adopted – Election of a Governor – Two Days’ Proceedings Entire, THE NEW YORK TIMES, April 3,
1860, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1860/04/26/news/late-arizona-provisional-governmentconvention-session-constitution-adopted.html (“TUCSON, Tuesday, April 3, 1860. A Convention of
delegates from all parts of Arizona, called for the purpose of forming a Provisional Government,
assembled in this place yesterday morning.”)
19. Before the start of the Civil War, a secessionist convention was held in Mesilla in the
Arizona Territory pledging Arizona as a Confederate State on March 16, 1861. Less than two weeks later,
on March 28, 1861, the convention was ratified in Tucson and Arizona was declared that it would be
admitted to the Union as a slave state. See Jana Bommersbach, How Arizona almost didn’t become a state,
The Arizona Republic (Feb. 13, 2012), www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2012/01/20/20120130arizonacentennial-state-fight.html.
20. See Veil; See supra note 4 at 6. (“The Organic Act establishing Arizona as a separate
territory on February 24, 1863 provided that “. . .the legislative enactments of the Territory of New
Mexico not inconsistent with the provisions of this act, are, hereby extended to and continued in force in
the said Territory of Arizona, until repealed or amended by future legislation.”)
21. See James E. Officer, Hispanic Arizona, 1536-1856, at pp. 288-291 (University of
Arizona Press, 1987)..
22. Id.
23. Id.
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Arizona.24
The government of the Confederate Territory of Arizona was located in
Mesilla, and Confederate Lieutenant Colonel John Baylor declared himself
Territorial Governor.25 However, the Union Army mounted a significant offense to
reclaim the Arizona Territory as part of the New Mexico Campaign. 26 The major
battle between Union and Confederate forces concerning the Arizona Territory was
the Battle of Glorieta Pass in March 1862, often called “The Gettysburg of the
West.”27 The Battle of Glorieta Pass was a significant defeat for the Confederate
Army, and the Confederate Territory of Arizona was subsequently forced to relocate
its capital from Mesilla to El Paso, Texas, in July 1862.28
In March 1862, around the same time as the Union victory at Glorieta Pass,
the United States House of Representatives passed the Arizona Organic Act, 29 which
created the Arizona Territory of the United States, with Tucson as its capital, 30 and
abolished slavery in the territory. 31 The Senate subsequently approved the act, and
President Abraham Lincoln signed it into law on February 24, 1863. 32 However,
despite the reclamation of the Arizona Territory by the Union, the territory continued
to be represented in the Confederate Congress until the end of the Civil War in
1865.33
C. The Jim Crow Southwest in the Arizona Territory: 1863-1912
Following the conclusion of the Civil War, many jurisdictions in the United
States passed racially discriminatory laws designed to prohibit non-White persons
from participating freely and fully in American society. These laws, which came to
be known as “Jim Crow” laws, were primarily enacted in the former Confederate
states in the South.34 While the existence of Jim Crow laws in the Southwest has not

24. Id. at 396 (“Confederate troops occupied Tucson from February until May, 1862, and
those not sympathetic to the Southern cause left town.”)
25. Baylor, a Texan, led the Confederate victory in the Battle of Mesilla. He was ousted as
governor shortly thereafter by Confederate President Jefferson Davis. See Mickey L. Dennis, The Buffalo
Soldier of the Western Frontier, at 85 (AuthorHouse; 2008).
26. Flint Whitlock, Distant Bugles, Distant Drums: The Union Response to the Confederate
Invasion of New Mexico (Univ. Press of Colo. 2006).
27. Id.
28. The seat of the government of the Confederate Territory of Arizona ultimately moved
from El Paso to San Antonio, remaining in exile in Texas until the end of the Civil War. See William L.
Richter, Historical Dictionary of the Civil War and Reconstruction, at 422 (Scarecrow Press, Inc. 2004).
29. H.R. 357, 37th Cong. (1862).
30. Despite this stipulation, the first capital of the Arizona Territory was actually Ft. Whipple,
which was succeeded as the capital by Prescott. Tucson did not become the capital until after the Civil
War, from 1867-1877 (when the capital seat was returned to Prescott). Phoenix, the capital of the modern
State of Arizona, became the territorial capital in 1889. See Andrew E. Masich, The Civil War in Arizona:
The Story of the California Volunteers, 1861-1865, at 261 (University of Oklahoma Press, 2006).
31. Although there was not a great number of slaves of African descent in the Arizona
Territory at the time the Arizona Organic Act expressly abolished slavery in the territory, the New Mexico
Territory did have a long history of slavery of American Indians – by both White and Hispanic settlers.
See supra note 10.
32. Supra note 30.
33. Id.at 172, n. 51 (describing Baylor’s election to the Confederate Congress and his
attempts to officially reclaim Arizona for the Confederacy until the end of the Civil War in April 1865).
34.
See
Encyclopedia
Britannica,
“Jim
Crow
law,”
available
at
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/303897/Jim-Crow-law (“Jim Crow law, in U.S. history, any

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2440747

RISING ARIZONA MCR.KC (DO NOT DELETE)

106

BERKELEY LA RAZA LAW JOURNAL

5/22/2014 10:29 AM

[Vol. XX:nnn

received much attention,35 an examination of the laws passed in the Arizona
Territory in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century demonstrates how the
territorial government of Arizona attempted to preserve the pre-Civil War culture of
White privilege and supremacy through the use of race-based exclusion laws.
At the time of the Arizona Territory’s inception, native Mexicans and
American Indians vastly outnumbered the White settlers in the Territory. 36
Therefore, one of the first laws of the new Arizona Territory in 1863 extended voting
rights only to White men.37 Because the Gadsden Treaty and the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo guaranteed United States citizenship to Mexican citizens in the
acquired territories, all Mexicans who acquired citizenship as a result of the treaties
were considered White under United States law, and could therefore vote in the
Arizona Territory.38
Despite this legal racial classification, however, the vast majority of White
settlers in the Arizona Territory viewed Mexicans as non-White.39 This led to an
effort in the Arizona Territory to reclassify United States citizens of Mexican descent
as American Indian rather than White, since at the time Indians were ineligible for
United States citizenship, and thus unable to vote. 40
1.

Mexicans and Whiteness in Territorial Arizona

As noted above, while Mexicans received American citizenship pursuant to
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo,41 legislatures with significant Mexican-American
of the laws that enforced racial segregation in the South between the end of the formal Reconstruction
period in 1877 and the beginning of a strong civil rights movement in the 1950s.
35. Jim Crow laws in the Southwest are sometimes referred to as “Juan Crow” laws,
reflecting the fact that the majority of persons targeted by race-based exclusion laws in the Southwest
were Latino. See e.g., Diane McWhorter, The Strange Career of Juan Crow, N.Y. Times (June 16, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/opinion/sunday/no-sweet-home-alabama.html?_r=0.
36. Id.
37. Voting rights in the Arizona Territory were guaranteed to “every white male citizen of the
United States, and every white male citizen of Mexico. See infra note 43.
38. The link between race and citizenship – namely, the requirement that one must be White
to be a United States citizen – was first established in the Naturalization Act of 1790, which provides for
citizenship only for “white immigrants.” See Statutes at Large, 1st Congress, 2nd Session (1790), available
at http://rs6.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llsl&fileName=001/llsl001.db&recNum=226. The text of the
Act reads in part: “[A]ny alien, being a free white person, who shall have resided within the limits and
under the jurisdiction of the United States for the term of two years, may be admitted to become a citizen
thereof. . .”. Thus, because of the interplay between the treaties between the United States and Mexico
following the Mexican-American War guaranteeing citizenship to Mexicans – and the requirement that all
citizens be white in the Naturalization Act – Mexican-Americans became “white by law.” See generally
Ian Haney Lopez, White By Law: The Legal Construction of Race (N.Y. Univ. Press 2006).
39. See infra note 43 at 30.
40. Although the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in 1868 extended
birthright citizenship to all persons born in the United States regardless of race, this grant of citizenship
did not extend to American Indians because they were deemed to be members of sovereign nations not
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884) (holding that an
American Indian born on Indian reservation in the U.S. territory is not a citizen of the United States under
the Fourteenth Amendment because Indian tribes are alien nations). American Indians were finally
granted United States citizenship by statute in the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924. See 43 U.S. Stats. At
Large, Ch. 233, p. 253 (1924); however, Arizona did not extend voting rights to American Indians until
1948. See Janine B. Pease, “Voting Rights in Indian Country,” at 169 (in AMERICAN INDIAN NATIONS:
YESTERDAY, TODAY, AND TOMORROW, George Horse Capture, Duane Champagne, and Chandler C.
Jackson, Eds., 2007).
41. By the year 1860, nearly 100,000 Mexicans had become American citizens under the
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populations began to interpret their laws in such a way that only provided “White
Mexicans” constitutional rights, thus prohibiting Mexicans of Indian and African
descent (who were commonly called mestizos or mulattoes) from voting, holding
public office, practicing law, testifying in court cases involving Whites, or serving on
juries.42 For example, the Arizona Territory limited suffrage to “[e]very white male
citizen of the United States, and every white male citizen of Mexico.” 43
However, because of racism against dark-skinned persons in general in the
Southwest, even legally White Mexicans were subject to the hallmark violence,
ostracism, and oppression of the Jim Crow regime in the United States. Professor
Salvador Acosta describes life in early Arizona in the following way:
The social experiences of Mexicans in Arizona proved that legal
whiteness did not necessarily translate into social toleration. They
were victims of lynchings and mob violence; a sheriff could
manipulate state tax laws to strip them of their property; they
participated on juries at lower rates than whites; they were subject
to more prosecutions, longer sentences, and a disproportionate
number of death sentences; hospitals often denied them services;
some employers – mines in particular – used dual-wage systems
where Mexicans received lower salaries for equal work and had no
access to higher-paying positions . . . [N]ativist organizations and
labor unions – many of which excluded Mexicans – endorsed
propositions to ban aliens from public projects . . . and to require
all employers to maintain their alien workforce at a maximum of
twenty percent, and to administer literacy tests to potential voters.
Mexicans were the primary targets of these political maneuvers
since the number of Chinese residents had declined significantly
and the black population was miniscule. 44
The parallels between the race-based exclusion laws of late-nineteenth
century Arizona and the laws targeting noncitizens in early twenty-first century
Arizona are clear to anyone with even a passing familiarity of the state’s recent
attempt to enforce its “attrition by enforcement” regime.45 When placed in this
historical and social context, much of the confusion over the origins of Arizona’s
“sudden” emergence as a hotbed of racism and nativism, and particularly the animus
directed toward Latinos, no longer seems so mysterious. Professor Acosta
demonstrates that in addition to American Indians, who are the largest non-White
population in the state,46 Mexicans in Arizona have long been the targets of racially
discriminatory laws designed to disenfranchise and marginalize their full

Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, notwithstanding the fact that the majority of them were not Caucasian and,
therefore, would likely not have otherwise qualified for United States citizenship under the Immigration
Act of 1790. See Salvador Acosta, Crossing Borders, Erasing Boundaries: Interethnic Marriages in
Tucson, 1854-1930, Ch. 3, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Arizona (2010).
42. See Acosta at 53.
43. See Katherine Benton-Cohen, Borderline Americans: Racial Division and Labor War in
the Arizona Borderlands, at p. 31. (Harvard Univ. Press 2009).
44. See Acosta at 56.
45. Discussed in depth in Part III: THE IMPACT OF JIM CROW ON MODERN ARIZONA
IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY.
46. See generally Acosta at 53.
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participation as citizens of Arizona and the United States.
2.

The Camp Grant Massacre of 1871

Perhaps the most striking example of the unequal protection and application
of the law in the Arizona Territory against non-White persons is the Camp Grant
Massacre, which occurred on April 30, 1871.47 Following rising tensions between
White settlers and the indigenous Apache, 48 a vigilante group slaughtered more than
100 Aravaipa and Pinal Apaches, the majority of whom were women and children. 49
The vigilante group, which called itself the Committee for Public Safety, blamed the
Apache for the widespread plundering of southern Arizona. 50 The group targeted
Camp Grant, located about 50 miles from Tucson and a hotbed of anti-Apache
sentiment at the time.51 Camp Grant was apparently targeted because the
commander, Royal Emerson Whitman, had permitted approximately 455 Apache to
receive rations and plant crops on land 5 miles outside of Camp Grant. 52
The catalyst for the Camp Grant Massacre appears to have been the driving
of livestock off the land in San Xavier on April 10, 1871.53 The attack was
exceptionally brutal, and because the Apache men were out hunting at the time of the
attack, women and children comprised all but 8 of the victims. 54 In response to
President Grant’s threat to place Arizona under martial law if the vigilantes were not
charged, some 115 members of the group were indicted and stood trial for murder in
federal district court in December 1871.55 However, the majority of the White
settlers in southern Arizona believed the massacre was justified because of the
alleged pillaging of the land by the Apache. 56 After a five day trial, a jury deliberated
only 19 minutes and acquitted all the defendants of murder charges. 57
The Camp Grant Massacre is a striking example of the racial tensions that
existed in the Territory of Arizona between Whites, Mexicans, and various American
Indian tribes, and the failure of the justice system to hold anyone accountable for
crimes committed against non-White persons in the Territory. Even before the Camp
Grant Massacre, the slaughter of American Indians in the Arizona Territory by White

47. For a detailed treatment of the events that gave rise to the Camp Grant Massacre, see
Thomas E. Sheridan, Arizona: A History 86-89 (Joseph C. Wilder ed., Univ. of Ariz. Press 2012).
48. Id.
49. See Veil, supra note 4 at 13. It is important to note that while two of the leaders of the
vigilante group - Sidney R. DeLong and William S. Oury - were both White men, the group as a whole
included Mexicans and American Indians, as well. See Id. Additionally, Jesus Maria Elias, a Mexican
Tucsonian, played a prominent role in the Camp Grant massacre and had previously organized an attack
against the Apache in Aravaipa Canyon in 1863. See Sheridan at 88. The precise numbers of the vigilante
group included six Whites (Anglos), forty-eight Mexicans, and ninety-four American Indians (O’odham).
Id. at 87.
50. See Sheridan, at 86-9.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 87.
54. The vigilantes “bounded forward . . . clubbing, stabbing, and splitting heads open with
rocks. . . By the time the carnage ended, about thirty children had been captured and more than a hundred
Aravaipas and Pinals had been mutilated and slain.” Id. at 87-8.
55. Id.
56. William Oury opined that the massacre was “the killing of about 144 of the most
bloodthirsty devils that ever disgraced mother earth.” Id. at 88.
57. Id.
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settlers and Mexicans is well-documented58 – and nearly never avenged.59 The
confluence of these three diverse communities in southern Arizona – whose lives
were so intertwined that historian Karl Jacoby has labeled them “intimate enemies” 60
– and the animosities, power struggles, and violence that occurred between and
among them as control of the Arizona Territory was wrested away from Mexico and
Indian tribes sheds light on the continuing racial and ethnic tensions among Whites
and non-Whites, and provides context for the roots of the xenophobic immigration
laws and policies in modern-day Arizona.61
3.

Anti-Miscegenation Laws in Territorial Arizona

Anti-Miscegenation laws, which prohibit marriage between persons of
different races, were commonplace until the United States Supreme Court declared
such laws unconstitutional in 1967.62 The first anti-miscegenation law in what is now
modern-day Arizona was enacted in 1857, when it was still part of the New Mexico
Territory.63 The territorial legislature initially prohibited marriages and cohabitation
between Black men and White women, although marriage between White men and
Black women was permitted.64 Both men and women found guilty of miscegenation
could be punished by two to three years of hard labor in prison. 65
Arizona became its own territory in 1863, and the First Territorial
Legislature met in Prescott, Arizona in the fall of 1864.66 One of the first laws passed
by the Arizona Territory was its anti-miscegenation law in 1864, which was based on
California’s anti-miscegenation statute at the time.67 In 1865, the Second Territorial
Legislature amended the law, which initially only prohibited marriage between
Blacks and Whites, to prohibit marriages between whites with “Negroes, mulattoes,
Indians, and Mongolians,”68 and declared all such marriages illegal and void in the
Arizona Territory.69 Although the Arizona anti-miscegenation statute did not prohibit
58. In the 1860s, bands of civilian militias took it upon themselves to exterminate the Indian
tribes in Arizona: “Pioneers with time on their hands and a taste for blood . . . went Indian hunting –
slaughtering men, women, and children wherever they found them. . . These were hit-and-run affairs,
often degenerating into massacres of women and children as well as men. Many Indians died, but not
enough to change the balance of power in the territory.” See Id. at 79-80.
59. Id.
60. See Id. at 89.
61. The extent to which the intermingling of these racial and ethnic groups in southern
Arizona and northern Mexico spurred racism among White settlers is best exemplified by the words of
Democratic politician John Ross Browne in 1863: “I think that Sonora can beat the world in the
production of villainous races. Miscegenation has prevailed in this country for three centuries. Every
generation of that population grows worse; and the Sonorans may now be ranked with their natural
comrades – Indians, burros, and coyotes.” See Benton-Cohen, at 29.
62. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
63. See Acosta at 39-40.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See Veil at 6.
67. In addition to the Arizona and New Mexico Territories, several other states and territories
in the American West had anti-miscegenation statutes in the 1850s and 1860s, among them California
(1850), Utah (1852), Washington (1855), Kansas (1855), and Nevada (1861). The Arizona antimiscegenation statute was copied word-for-word from the California statute. See Acosta at 40.
68. The inclusion of “Mongolians” in the territorial anti-miscegenation statute is a reflection
of the anti-Chinese sentiment that was prevalent at the time. See Id.
69. See Id. at 41. (providing that “marriages of white persons with negroes or mulattos are
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cohabitation between persons of different races,70 the punishment for violating the
Arizona law was a fine in the range of $100 to $10,000, and a prison term of
anywhere from three months to ten years. 71 However, although intermarriage in
Arizona itself constituted a misdemeanor, Arizona did recognize interracial
marriages legally entered into in other jurisdictions. 72
As Professor Acosta notes, he “the Arizona Territory also holds the dubious
distinction of being the one of the first legislatures to include definitions of
Whiteness in its anti-miscegenation law.”73 This is due to the revision of the 1865
statute in 1887 to add the word “descendants” to the list of minority groups. 74 “”The
revised statute prohibited marriages between “persons of Caucasian blood or their
descendants with Africans, Mongolians and their descendants,”75 which is a
precursor to the American “one-drop” laws defining Whiteness.76 Thus, it is
important to note that while Mexicans were White by law, 77 and therefore marriages
between Caucasians and Mexicans were not strictly prohibited by Arizona’s antimiscegenation statutes, the fact that Mexicans could be classified as mestizos,
mulattos and/or Indians guaranteed their de facto inclusion in Arizona’s race-based
exclusion laws, including its anti-miscegenation statute.78 However, although
intermarriage in Arizona itself was a misdemeanor, Arizona did recognize interracial
marriages that were legally entered into in other jurisdictions. 79
a.

In re Walker’s Estate80

An early case upholding the constitutionality of territorial Arizona’s antimiscegenation statute was In re Walker’s Estate, which was decided by the Arizona
Supreme Court in 1896.81 The case concerned a claim filed against the estate of a
White man, John D. Walker, by his daughter Juana following his death. 82 Juana
declared to be illegal and void.”).
70. The anti-miscegenation statute in the New Mexico Territory prohibited cohabitation as
well as marriage. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Acosta at 44.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Professor Acosta notes that a bizarre unintended consequence – and absurd result – of the
Arizona Territory’s anti-miscegenation statute is that it “forbade virtually all people of mixed ancestry –
and who had at least one white ancestor – from marrying anyone . . . Therefore, all mestizos and mulattoes
who married anyone between 1887 and 1942 [when Arizona’s anti-miscegenation statute was amended]
effectively broke the law.” See Id at 46.
77. See Id. at 52, 61.
78. See Id. at 71. Professor Acosta notes that, because of Mexicans were both legally White
and socially non-White, they were often permitted to violate Arizona’s anti-miscegenation statutes by
marrying non-White persons. He also observes that “Mexicans partially benefited from their legal
whiteness. . . Mexicans thus occupied a unique place in the legal and social spaces of the west. They
belonged to the only ethnic cohort that oscillated between whiteness and non-whiteness as a group. This
racial ambiguity, perhaps because of the long history of mestisaje among Mexicans, probably facilitated
the acceptance of their marriages with non-whites, both with civil officials and among the Mexican
community. In their eyes, these marriages seemed natural, regardless of the law that prohibited them.”
79. Acosta at 41.
80. In Re. Walker, 5 Ariz. 70 (Ariz. Terr. 1896).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 74.
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claimed that her mother, a Pima Indian woman named Chur-ga, was married to John
Walker “according to the customs of such Indians governing marriage, and that she
is the child of such union.”83 At the time, Arizona’s anti-miscegenation statute
provided that “All marriages of white persons with negroes, mulattoes, Indians, or
Mongolians, are declared illegal or void.”84
In denying Juana’s claim against the estate of her father, the Arizona
Supreme Court stated that “[i]t is readily seen that this pretended marriage, if it had
been a marriage in fact, was illegal and void, and imposed no obligation on either
party thereto.”85 The Court continued:
We do hold . . . that marriage in fact could not be consummated at
the time this was alleged to have taken place, in Arizona, between
a Pima Indian squaw and a white man . . . Such marriages are null
and void.86
In reaching this conclusion, the Court expressly rejected Juana’s argument
that her parents’ marriage was valid because “it was established and existed between
them on the Pima and Maricopa Indian reservation according to the customs of such
Indians, and notwithstanding the laws of Arizona forbade such marriages.” 87 Juana’s
argument was premised on the notion that because her parents’ marriage occurred on
the Indian reservation and was valid there, that Arizona must recognize the marriage
because Arizona law recognized legal marriages entered into in other jurisdictions. 88
The Court rejected this argument by asserting the plenary power of the
United States government over Indians, stating:
This doctrine is not tenable in a territory. There is only one
sovereignty here, - that of the United States, - which delegates its
power to the territory to legislate on all rightful subjects of
legislation . . . If both of these parties had been Indians, the courts
would recognize such relations as a marriage. Such marriages
between a white man and an Indian woman have been upheld by
the decisions of some of the states . . . But such marriages have
never been recognized in Arizona.89
Thus, despite the fact that John Walker had entered into a valid marriage by
Indian customs and recognized Juana as his child during his life, 90 the Arizona
Supreme Court held that his marriage to Chur-ga was null and void under Arizona’s
83. Id.
84. Id. at 75 (citing “Marriages,” Comp. Law Ariz. 1877).
85. Id.
86. See 5 Ariz. at 75.
87. Id. at 76.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 76-7.
90. Although Juana’s counsel offered to proffer testimony from witnesses to support her
assertion that John Walker recognized her as his child, the court stated that she had not met her evidentiary
burden to support a claim to his estate: “If she had offered testimony showing that she was the offspring of
an illicit union between John D. Walker and a Pima Indian squaw named Chur-ga, and that she had
changed her status from a Pima Indian to the child of John D. Walker, who, when he left the Pima Indian
reservation, instead of leaving her there, had taken her with him, and educated her, introduced her to his
relatives, and held her out to the world as his daughter . . . there might be some basis for her claim.” Id. at
76.
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anti-miscegenation statute, and denied Juana’s claim against her father’s estate. 91
In re Walker’s Estate is significant because it marked the first time that the
constitutionality of Arizona Territory’s anti-miscegenation law was recognized and
that it applied to all citizens in the state of Arizona. 92 Thus, because the antimiscegenation statute was held to be constitutional, it was able to be invoked in
successive cases in order to keep non-White offspring from inheriting property or
otherwise invoking their status of heirs of White persons. 93 This decision would
remain good law until well into the next century, when Arizona’s anti-miscegenation
law was finally repealed in 1962.94
D. Race, Labor, and the Quest for Statehood
The issue of race in the Arizona Territory’s quest for statehood was
significant, and the fact that the majority of the inhabitants of the territory were nonWhite is the main reason why Arizona did not achieve statehood for nearly 50
years.95 As early as the 1860s, members of the United States Congress were opposed
to Arizona’s bid for territorial status because of its lack of a significant White
population.96 In order to attract more White persons to the Arizona Territory in order
to gain statehood, territorial politicians sought ways to expand industries in Arizona
– such as railroad and mining – while also discouraging or prohibiting non-White
persons from migrating to the territory and further jeopardizing its statehood
ambitions.97
1.

Chinese in the Arizona Territory

The first federal law excluding certain classes of immigrants based on race,
The Chinese Exclusion Law, was enacted in 1882.98 The Chinese Exclusion Law
barred Chinese immigrants from obtaining United States citizenship, and made it
nearly impossible for most Chinese to immigrate to the United States. 99 Given the
rampant anti-Chinese sentiment in the United States during the 1870s and 1880s,100 it
is not surprising that there was significant racism against the Chinese in territorial

91. Id. at 80.
92. See Acosta at 64-5.
93. Id. at 70-1. (“Interracial relations threatened the purity of the white race, but, more
importantly, interracial marriage was a greater concern to whites because marriage carried legitimacy,
respectability, and economic benefits – such as inheritance, alimony and child support. Legal disputes that
invoked miscegenation primarily involved property. . . All cases concerning the legality of interethnic
unions in Arizona resulted in the loss of property or rights of non-whites, particularly of non-white women
and their children, to the benefit of whites.”).
94. See Id. at 51.
95. See Id. at 54. Mexicans were considered White by law, and therefore were counted by the
proponents of granting Arizona territorial status as White. However, opponents in Congress argued that
only ten percent of the White residents of Arizona were non-Mexicans – which would have meant that, in
1863, the entire Arizona territory had only 600 White residents. See also Benton-Cohen, at 18-48.
96. Id.
97. Id. Mining was a major industry in the Arizona Territory, and seven of the ten territorial
legislators affiliated with mining voted for the 1865 amendment to the anti-miscegenation statute
prohibiting marriage between Whites and Indians.
98. See Benton-Cohen at 72
99. Id.
100. Id.
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Arizona. Some of the first race-based exclusion laws in the Arizona Territory were
directed at Chinese immigrants, and served as models for subsequent race-based
exclusion laws against other non-White persons.101
Although the overall Chinese population in Arizona was relatively small,
their presence in Arizona building the railroads and working in the mines prompted a
backlash – particularly near Tombstone, where approximately 1,000 Chinese
laborers were living while constructing the Southern Pacific Railroad. 102
Professor Katherine Benton-Cohen notes that the anti-Chinese activism by
White settlers in Arizona “demonstrated, like the removal of the Apaches, a
persistent commitment to racial exclusion.” 103 In 1880, the United States Census
reported forty-four Chinese residents living in Tombstone. 104 Shortly thereafter, John
Clum, the editor of the Tombstone Epitaph, organized an Anti-Chinese League
which railed against “the despised Mongolians” and vowed “to rid the town of
evil.”105 The passage of the federal Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882106 only added fuel
to the fire, and in February 1886, Tombstone citizens called for a boycott of local
Chinese businesses due to the “influx of Chinese.”107
Like modern-day Arizona, the anti-Chinese fever in Tombstone during the
1880s was spurred, at least in part, by political opportunism. 108 Professor BentonCohen writes:
Both the 1880s and 1886 [anti-Chinese] campaigns were launched
by political aspirants looking for a hot issue. In 1880 John Clum
was running successfully for mayor and hoping to sell newspapers.
In 1886, a Tombstone “Anti-Chinese Political Party” ran slates of
local candidates. Chinese immigrants were an easy target: they
could not vote and they employed mostly fellow Chinese. 109
Another similarity between the anti-Chinese movement and modern antiimmigrant laws in Arizona is the passage of local ordinances across the state
designed to harass and intimidate local Chinese residents, such as laws requiring the
health inspection of laundries (which were mainly Chinese-owned businesses).110 As
Professor Benton-Cohen notes, “In the late nineteenth century, Chinese, not
Mexicans, were the primary targets of anti-immigrant campaigns in the West . . .The
Chinese were the nation’s first ‘illegal immigrants,’ and the first to be refused entry

101. Id. at 71-9.
102. Id. at 71 (“At their peak numbers, in mid-1882, Chinese made up only about 4 percent of
Tombstone’s population, a much lower percentage than in many western mining regions. . . Small
numbers, however, did not stop the Tombstone activists, who, drawing on precedents elsewhere in the
West, launched local anti-Chinese campaigns in 1880 and 1886.”).
103. Id.
104. See Benton-Cohen at 73.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 74.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See Benton-Cohen at 74. (“One movement leader, Stanley Bagg, was elected to the
[Tombstone] city council, where he secured an ordinance to require the health inspection of laundries.
Many communities passed such ordinances, which provided a way to harass Chinese businesses and
reflected a fear that the Chinese would spread disease.”).
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on the basis of nationality alone – which became an easy proxy for race.”111 She
continues:
In the early years of border enforcement, agents were concerned
not with excluding Mexicans, but with preventing Chinese from
coming in from Mexico. The predecessors of today’s Border Patrol
were the so-called “Chinese inspectors” first appointed in 1891.
Some newspapers in the early twentieth century even referred to
“Chinese wetbacks” (though Arizona border crossers trekked on
dry land).112
Finally, the threat of cheap labor that Chinese immigrants signified to White
settlers is also reminiscent of modern anti-immigrant sentiment against Latinos in
Arizona. The perception that the increase in Chinese immigrants contributed to lower
wages for the White working class caused the Arizona Republican Party to officially
take an anti-Chinese immigrant stance in its party platform, stating: “The
immigration of the so-called “Coolies” to complete with the intelligent white
laborers of our land is degrading to their manhood.” 113 Thus, “Chinese exclusion
created a framework for immigration control that would dramatically shape the
future of Mexicans and many others” 114 not just at the federal level, but at the state
level in Arizona, for years to come.
2.

Race-Based Exclusion Laws in Arizona’s Mining Industry – the
Bisbee “White Man’s Camp”

The most notorious incidence of racial exclusion in Bisbee was the Bisbee
Deportation of 1917, in which thousands of non-White (and “questionably
White”)115 miners were “deported” from Arizona to New Mexico.116 Along with
many other mining towns in the West, Bisbee had long been subject to local “district
codes” that, in addition to addressing mining and sanitation laws, also contained
provisions excluding Chinese, Mexican, and South American miners – hence, the
development of the settlements known as “white man’s camps.” 117 Such race-based
exclusion laws in the mine camps existed in Arizona as early as 1863, when the
Pioneer Mining District passed a resolution that barred “Asiatics & Sonorans” from
working in the mines there.118 By the end of the century, the copper-mining towns of
111. Id. at 77.
112. Id. Benton-Cohen also notes that “[t]hen, as now, the term ‘wetback’ conjured an image
of poverty, illegality, and racial otherness.”
113. Id. at 78.
114. Id. at 79.
115. Id. at 95-104. Those who were “questionably white” in late nineteenth century Arizona
included Southern Europeans, primarily Italian and Slavonic workers. (“[N]o well-established rules
existed about whether Italians or Serbs counted as white or could work underground . . . Like Mexicans,
Italians supposedly threatened the American standard of living . . . In some ways, Italians were ‘honorary
Mexicans’ . . . But it was more complicated than that, because Italians were both more white than
Mexicans, and nonwhite in a different way. . . Unlike African Americans and Asians, Italians, like other
Europeans, were legally ‘white on arrival’ . . . Even so, in 1898, lawmakers in the racially complex state
of Louisiana had seriously contemplated disenfranchising Italians along with African Americans.”)
Benton-Cohen at 96, 100.
116. See Id. at 211-6.
117. Id. at 82.
118. Id. The Pioneer Mining District is near modern-day Prescott, Arizona.
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Jerome, Globe, and Bisbee all had large white man’s camp settlements. 119
Bisbee in particular was inhospitable – even hostile – to non-White persons
who attempted to live or work in the town. Following Tombstone’s lead, Bisbee first
enacted a series of laws aimed at Chinese immigrants, forbidding them from being in
town after sundown, a common restriction among so-called “Sundown Towns” in the
Jim Crow South and Southwest.120 The district – known as the Warren District121 then targeted Mexican workers, who were permitted to live and work in the district,
but who could not hold the best-paying jobs in the underground mines. 122 Even when
Mexican workers did work in the same jobs as their White counterparts, they were
subject to the “dual-wage” system of the Southwest in which Mexicans were openly
paid less money for the same work performed by Whites.123 For example, a pay scale
published by Copper Queen in 1885 listed two different wages for wheeling adobe
bricks based on race - $2.25 a day for “whites,” versus $1.50 a day for
“Mexicans.”124
Thus, “the rules of the white man’s camp [in Bisbee] made the [racial]
division formal and explicit. A promotional issue of the Bisbee Daily Review
published for the St. Louis World’s Fair in 1904 explained that Bisbee ‘is strictly a
‘white man’s camp’ . . . Mexicans are employed only in the common or rough
labor.’”125 Professor Benton-Cohen puts the ethos of the “white man’s camp” into
context with her astute observation that:
The rules of the white man’s camp were designed to protect the
white workers who created them . . . The rules of the white man’s
camp constituted a kind of ideology. They did much more than
create a list of job categories. They also structured local
citizenship, hierarchy, and values, and they did so by projecting a
particular worldview. These rules discriminated, even as they
conveyed the notion that the discrimination was necessary and
inevitable.126
This structure created a worldview consistent with the belief that favoring
Whites over non-Whites was not just favorable, but “natural.”127 It is this ideology
that made it possible for Arizona’s pattern and practice of enacting race-based
exclusion laws, particularly against noncitizens, to continue long after the abolition

119. Id.
120. Id. at 82-3. (“Chinese truck farmers along the San Pedro River could sell fruits and
vegetables in town, so long as they left by sundown. This rule linked Bisbee with hundreds of other
‘sundown towns’ across the country where racial minorities – usually but not always African Americans –
were forbidden to dally after dark, sometimes on pain of death. Bisbee’s complete exclusion of Chinese
lasted as late as 1920 and probably longer.”).
121. Benton-Cohen at 83.
122. See Id. 83.
123. Id. at 83-4. (“Across the Southwest, even highly skilled Mexican men were shunted into
positions labeled ‘helper’ or ‘assistant.’ ‘One candid American mechanic’ in another mining camp
admitted to federal labor investigator Victor Clark in 1908, ‘They will never pay a Mexican what he’s
really worth compared with a white man. I know a Mexican that’s the best blacksmith I ever knew. . .
But they pay him $1.50 a day as a helper, working under an American blacksmith who gets $7 a day.”).
124. Id. at 84.
125. Id. at 84-5.
126. Id. at 86.
127. Benton-Cohen at 300.
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of the “white man’s camps” and well into the twenty-first century.
3.

Arizona’s Constitutional Convention: 1910-1912

Although it achieved independent territorial status in 1893, Arizona and its
sister New Mexico Territory had still had not been granted statehood by the early
twentieth century.128 Following a proposal by the chairman of the Senate committee
on territories to admit the Arizona and New Mexico Territories as one state, the
White settlers in Arizona were outraged and fought bitterly against their potential
inclusion with New Mexico and its large, powerful Hispanic population. 129 The
powerful labor lobby in Arizona also opposed joint statehood, and the proposal went
down in defeat in 1906 due to its overwhelming rejection by Arizona voters. 130
As Professor Thomas Sheridan notes, “[f]rom then on, the battle was to
shape the kind of state Arizona would inevitably become.” 131 One of the key battles
following the signing of the Enabling Act by President Taft on June 20, 1910,
admitting both Arizona and New Mexico to the Union, concerned the roles both race
and labor played in the formation of Arizona’s constitutional convention. 132
Although the labor unions in Arizona ultimately were successful in achieving most
of their agenda at the constitutional convention, 133 they were unable to secure the
passage of a provision to restrict alien labor in Arizona. 134 Labor union leaders at the
time held the opinion that Mexican workers were a threat to advancement of
organized labor in the Southwest – they believed that Mexican workers were strikebreakers who were willing to work for lower wages than their English-speaking
counterparts, and that their lack of English language skills endangered other
workers.135
Labor leaders sought the inclusion of race-based exclusion laws in the
Arizona Constitution through a series of propositions. The first of these proposals,

128. That the delay in granting both Arizona Territory and New Mexico Territory was
predicated largely on the concern that the territories had significant non-White populations is undisputed.
See Sheridan at 181. (“[O]pponents [for statehood] argued that neither ‘the desert sands of Arizona’ nor
‘the humble Spanish-speaking people of New Mexico’ were ready for statehood.”).
129. Id. (“Arizonans reacted [to the statehood proposal] with an indignation that was as much
racist as righteous . . . The majority of New Mexico’s population was Hispanic, and an entrenched
Hispanic oligarchy wielded considerable power. Arizona, in contrast, had fewer Hispanics, and they were
practically disenfranchised except in a few strongholds like Tucson and Florence. As one senator from
South Carolina proclaimed, Arizona’s opposition to joint statehood was ‘a cry of a pure blooded white
community against the domination of a mixed breed aggression of citizens of New Mexico, who are
Spaniards, Indians, Greasers, Mexicans, and everything else.”).
130. New Mexicans voted to approve joint statehood by a vote of 26,195 to 14,735, while
Arizona rejected the measure by a vote of 16,265 to 3,141. See Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 182.
133. The labor unions and their progressive allies sought the inclusion of many pro-labor
provisions in the Arizona Constitution, including an eight-hour work day, liability for employers, worker’s
compensation, and the abolition of child labor. Many of these provisions succeeded, including the
prohibition of child labor and the establishment of an eight-hour work day in Article 18 of the Arizona
Constitution, as well as a prohibition on employee “blacklists” by employers, worker’s compensation, and
protection for workers in hazardous occupations. See Id. at 182-83.
134. See Id. at 183.
135. Sheridan at 183. However, Professor Sheridan notes that the notion that others were
endangered because Mexican workers did not speak English was “a racist assumption with no basis in the
accident records of the mines that employed them.”
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Proposition 48, provided that “no one who was not a citizen or had not declared his
intention of becoming a citizen could be employed on any public project at the state,
county, or municipal level.”136 Supporters of the initiative argued that the proposition
was necessary because Mexican and American Indian workers were driving down
wages. As Professor Sheridan notes, these were “[t]he same arguments [that] had
been advanced in the debate over Chinese labor on the railroads in the 1880s, and
they would be repeated over and over again during labor-management struggle in the
years to come.”137 Proposition 48 ultimately passed, though by a very narrow margin
of only five votes.138
The other two racial-exclusion laws proposed by organized labor were less
successful. Proposition 89, which was introduced by Yavapai County delegate
Michael Cunniff, would have banned the importation of alien contract laborers –
although such labor was already prohibited by federal law. 139 After Proposition 89
died in committee,140 organized labor then introduced Proposition 91, which would
have “prohibited anyone who could not ‘speak the English language’ from working
in ‘underground or other hazardous occupations,’” as well as forbidding most
employers from having an “alien labor” workforce of more than twenty percent. 141 In
practical terms, the limits placed on “alien labor” in Proposition 91 would have
meant that:
Mexicans, Italians, and other non-English speaking immigrants could not
work in the mines or as brakemen or engineers on the railroads. Moreover, Mexican
nationals could not constitute more than 20 percent of any ranch’s cowboys, any
lumber company’s mill workers, or any field’s farm hands. 142
Because of Arizona’s significant non-White and immigrant population, such
restrictions would have been devastating:
According to a US Immigration Commission study in 1911, 60
percent of Arizona’s smelter workers were Mexicans, half of
whom had been in the United States less than five years. There are
no reliable figures for the agricultural sector, but the percentage of
Mexicans on farms and ranches was undoubtedly higher.
Proposition 91 therefore threatened not just Mexican labor but the
entire foundation of Arizona’s extractive economy. 143
Thus, Proposition 91 lost most of its support from non-labor delegates, and
was defeated by a vote of 26 to 19.144 The race-based exclusions against Mexicans
136. Id. “Mexican road construction workers, whom labor wanted to replace with union men,
were the primary targets.” Id. at 183-4.
137. Id. at 184. Michael Cunniff, a Yavapai County delegate who supported Proposition 48,
said at the time, “If the right salary is paid, they will get American labor where they are now compelled to
take Mexican or Indian.”
138. Id.
139. Id. The author notes that this attempt to include in the state law of Arizona restrictions
against aliens that were already present in federal law is very reminiscent of the state’s targeting on
noncitizens through S.B. 1070 in 2010. Discussed in depth in Part III: THE IMPACT OF JIM CROW
ON MODERN ARIZONA IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY.
140. See Sheridan at 184.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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proposed during Arizona’s constitutional convention were rooted in some provisions
passed by the territorial legislature. In 1909, just one year before Arizona’s
constitutional convention convened, the twenty-fifth territorial legislature had passed
a law that prohibited the voter registration of individuals who could not read a
portion of the United. States Constitution and write his name. 145 Of course, this
literacy test had the (intended) result of disenfranchising a significant percentage of
Mexican-American citizens, much like similar literacy laws did to African-American
voters in the Jim Crow South. 146 Unfortunately, as the next section will discuss, racebased exclusion laws – particularly those aimed at non-White persons’ ability to vote
and work – did not subside when the constitutional convention concluded and
Arizona was admitted to statehood.

II.

THE STATE OF ARIZONA AND JIM CROW LAWS: 1912-1962

Arizona finally gained statehood on February 14, 1912, becoming the 48th
State in the Union.147 As noted previously, part of the reason for the long delay in
admitting both New Mexico 148 and Arizona to statehood was due to the fact that a
significant percentage of the Territories’ population was non-White.149 Like Southern
states that discriminated against African-Americans on the basis of race, Arizona and
other Southwestern states implemented laws and policies that segregated Latinos and
American Indians from the White population and inhibited their ability to participate
freely and fully in the public sphere.150 While some of the laws in the Jim Crow
Southwest were federal laws, many of the laws with the widest sweep were the racebased exclusion and segregation laws of the State of Arizona. 151 Thus, the laws
ultimately did the most damage to the civil liberties of Latinos and American
Indians. Furthermore, as the Arizona Territorial Legislature did previously, the
Arizona State Legislature targeted interracial marriage, suffrage, and labor, as well
as the segregated education of non-White persons – primarily American Indians.
A. Race and Labor in the New State of Arizona
Much like modern-day Arizona, race-based exclusion laws in the state’s
early history came into being through the ballot initiative process, which is provided
for in the Arizona Constitution.152 In the November 1914 election, Arizona voters
145. Id.
146. See Sheridan at 184.
147. A previous bid for statehood by Arizona failed in 1902. See Robert W. Larson, New
Mexico’s Quest for Statehood, 1846-1912, at 205.
148. New Mexico was the 47th State admitted to the Union, on January 6, 1912 – just a little
over a month prior to Arizona. See supra note 17.
149. See, e.g., Juan F. Perea, A Brief History of Race and the U.S.-Mexican Border: Tracing
the Trajectories of Conquest, 51 UCLA L. REV. 283, 298-300 (2003). (“While Texas and California were
promptly admitted to statehood because of white political control in each of the states, New Mexico
languished for sixty-two years as a federal territory. Among the principal reasons for denying statehood to
New Mexico were that racially mixed, dark-skinned Mexicans lived there and that they spoke Spanish.”).
150. See generally Brian D. Behnken, ed., The Struggle in Black and Brown: African
American and Mexican American Relations During the Civil Rights Era, (University of Nebraska Press,
2012).
151. Id. at 6-8 (providing examples of racial segregation laws affecting non-whites in the
Southwest, including Arizona).
152. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, § 1
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overwhelmingly passed a ballot initiative providing that “80 percent of the
employees of any individual or firm had to be ‘qualified electors or native born
citizens of the United States.’”153 The initiative, which was known as the KinneyClaypool or the Eighty-Percent Bill, won by a margin of 10,694 votes.154 This was
likely due in no small part to the fear-mongering by those such as the editors of the
Arizona Labor Journal, who urged the Arizona electorate to support the initiative
because the state “cannot assimilate untold hordes of aliens.”155
However, the Eighty-Percent bill did not just affect Mexican laborers – it
applied to all foreign workers, and some of them fought back. The most prominent
noncitizen worker in Arizona to challenge the restriction against foreign labor was
Mike Raich, a cook from Austria who filed suit in the United States District Court to
keep his job.156 Raich’s case eventually made it all the way to the United States
Supreme Court, foreshadowing Arizona’s attempt to regulate noncitizens at the state
level in the early twenty-first century, and with much the same result.
1.

Truax v. Raich157

In November 1915, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in
Truax v. Raich, which challenged the constitutionality of a law placing restrictions
on the employment of non-citizens in the State of Arizona.158 The challenged
provision, which had been approved as a ballot initiative by Arizona voters in 1914,
was entitled “An Act to Protect the Citizens of the United States in Their
Employment against Noncitizens of the United States, in Arizona, and to Provide
Penalties and Punishment for the Violation Thereof.” 159 The law provided that:
Section 1. Any company, corporation, partnership, association or
individual who is, or may hereafter become an employer of more
than five (5) workers at any one time, in the state of Arizona,
regardless of kind or class of work, or sex of workers, shall employ
not less than eighty (80) per cent qualified electors or native-born
citizens of the United States or some subdivision thereof.
Sec. 2. Any company, corporation, partnership, association or
individual, their agent or agents, found guilty of violating any of
the provisions of this act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and,
upon conviction thereof, shall be subject to a fine of not less than
one hundred ($100) dollars, and imprisoned for not less than thirty
(30) days.
Sec. 3. Any employee who shall misrepresent, or make false
statement, as to his or her nativity or citizenship, shall, upon

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

See Sheridan at 185.
Id. at 186.
Id.
Id.
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
Id.
Id. at 35.
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conviction thereof, be subject to a fine of not less than one hundred
($100) dollars, and imprisoned for not less than thirty (30) days. 160
On December 15, 1914, Mike Raich, a cook in Bisbee of Austrian descent,
filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona after being
informed by his employer that he was being fired pursuant to the law restricting the
employment of noncitizens in the state of Arizona. 161 Raich alleged that the Arizona
law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, and sought to have the law enjoined as unconstitutional. 162 In its
decision striking down the law, the Court first made clear the Fourteenth
Amendment protects noncitizens:
[T]he complainant, a native of Austria, has been admitted to the
United States under the Federal law. He was thus admitted with the
privilege of entering and abiding in the United States, and hence of
entering and abiding in any state in the Union. . . Being lawfully an
inhabitant of Arizona, the complainant is entitled under the 14th
Amendment to the equal protection of its laws. The description,
‘any person within its jurisdiction,’ as it has frequently been held,
includes aliens.163
The Court then addressed whether the Arizona law restricting the
employment of aliens is a legitimate exercise of state power:
It is sought to justify this act as an exercise of the power of the
state to make reasonable classifications in legislating to promote
the health, safety, morals, and welfare of those within its
jurisdiction. But this admitted authority, with the broad range of
legislative discretion that it implies, does not go so far as to make it
possible for the state to deny to lawful inhabitants, because of their
race or nationality, the ordinary means of earning a livelihood. . . It
is no answer to say, as it is argued, that the act proceeds upon the
assumption that ‘the employment of aliens, unless restrained, was a
peril to the public welfare.’ The discrimination against aliens in the
wide range of employments to which the act relates is made an end
in itself, and thus the authority to deny to aliens, upon the mere
fact of their alienage, the right to obtain support in the ordinary
fields of labor, is necessarily involved.164
The Court then addressed the issue that would be central to another case it
would hear nearly one hundred years later in Arizona v. United States:165 whether the
Arizona law regulating noncitizens is in conflict with, and therefore preempted by,
federal law:

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 35 (quoting Laws of Arizona, 1915. Initiative Measure, p. 12.).
Id. at 36.
Id.
239 U.S. 33, 39.
Id. at 41-2.
Arizona v. U.S., 567 U.S. ___ (2012).
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It must also be said that reasonable classification implies action
consistent with the legitimate interests of the state, and it will not
be disputed that these cannot be so broadly conceived as to bring
them into hostility to exclusive Federal power. The authority to
control immigration—to admit or exclude aliens—is vested solely
in the Federal government. . . The assertion of an authority to deny
to aliens the opportunity of earning a livelihood when lawfully
admitted to the state would be tantamount to the assertion of the
right to deny them entrance and abode, for in ordinary cases they
cannot live where they cannot work. And, if such a policy were
permissible, the practical result would be that those lawfully
admitted to the country under the authority of the acts of Congress,
instead of enjoying in a substantial sense and in their full scope the
privileges conferred by the admission, would be segregated in such
of the states as chose to offer hospitality. 166
Thus, as Justice Kennedy would affirm many years later, the United States
Supreme Court held federal immigration law restricts the ability of Arizona to pass
its own state regulations on aliens, and invalidated the state employment law. 167
It is important to note that unlike S.B. 1070 in 2012, 168 the Court in Raich
ruled that the Arizona law was invalid under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment as a discriminatory regulation of lawfully present aliens. 169
This is an important distinction, because while it is clear that aliens are “persons”
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore entitled to
constitutional protections,170 the extent to which those protections extend to
undocumented aliens and the level of constitutional scrutiny that should be afforded
to such regulations in various contexts remains unsettled. 171
B. Educational Segregation in Arizona
1.

Segregation Between African-American and White Students in
Arizona

Despite Arizona’s relatively small African-American population,172 the Jim
Crow Southwest operated under the “separate but equal” educational system for
Black and White students in public schools in the Jim Crow South, a regime that had

166. 239 U.S. 33, 42.
167. 567 U.S. __ . (2012).
168. S.B. 1070 was struck down purely on preemption grounds. See Id.
169. 239 U.S. at 42.
170. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886); see also Wong Wing v. U.S., 163 U.S.
228 (1896); U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649 (1898).
171. The only United States Supreme Court case addressing the constitutional rights of
undocumented aliens is Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). The case, which is a very narrow decision
involving the rights of undocumented children to receive a free public education, holds that state
regulations of undocumented individuals based on their immigration status are to be analyzed under the
intermediate scrutiny standard. Id.
172. As of 2010, the African-American population in Arizona is 4.5% statewide. See United
States Census Bureau, available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/04000.html.
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been in place since before statehood.173 A 1909 statute of the Arizona Territory gave
school district trustees the authority to segregate Black students from White children,
where there were “more than eight Negro pupils” in the school district. 174 The
territorial legislature passed the segregation law over a veto by the governor, and
public schools remained segregated after Arizona achieved statehood.175 Indeed, in
1927, the law provided that in areas with 25 or more Black high school students, an
election would be called to determine if these pupils should be segregated in separate
but equal facilities.176
White students in Arizona were also segregated from Latino and American
Indian students in public education.177 Until recently, the segregation between White
students and students of color in Tucson remained subject to consent decree pursuant
to a settlement in a school desegregation case originally filed in 1974 on behalf of
African-American and Mexican-American students and employees of the Tucson
Unified School District.178 However, perhaps the most striking example of racebased inequality in Arizona education occurred in the case of American Indians, who
were taken from their families of origin and enrolled in the Phoenix Indian Industrial
Boarding School with the goal of “assimilating” them to White culture.179
2.

The Phoenix Indian Industrial Boarding School (“The Phoenix
Indian School”)

Like many States, Arizona has a long and shameful history of separate,
unequal, and discriminatory treatment of American Indians. To this day, one of the
major thoroughfares in Maricopa County bears the name Indian School Road - which
commemorates the Phoenix Indian School, one of the most egregious examples of
discriminatory treatment of American Indians in Arizona and the attempt by White
settlers to strip them of their cultures and “assimilate” them into theirs.
Although the “education” of American Indians in schools designed to
indoctrinate them with White culture and values is not unique to Arizona, 180 the
173. Many African-American students in Arizona attended the Phoenix Colored High School,
which was established in 1926. Prior to the establishment of the segregated high school, AfricanAmerican students were segregated in the “colored department” of Phoenix Union High School, which
held classes in the basement of the high school. See The African American Registry, “The Phoenix
Colored
High
School,
Haven
for
the
Mind,”
available
at
http://www.aaregistry.org/historic_events/view/phoenix-colored-high-school-haven-mind.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. In February 2013, United States District Judge David Bury approved TUSD’s Unitary
Status Plan. See Tucson school desegregation approved; Mexican American Studies could return, Tucson
News Now, Feb. 6, 2013, available at http://www.kcbd.com/story/21017652/tucson-schooldesegregation-consent-decree-okd.
179. Discussed in depth in Part II: THE STATE OF ARIZONA AND JIM CROW LAWS,
Educational Segregation in Arizona: The Phoenix Indian Boarding School.
180. Following the conclusion of the Civil War, the United States government began to
assume responsibility for the education of American Indians, both on and off the Reservations. See Robert
A. Trennert, The Phoenix Indian School: Forced Assimilation in Arizona, 1891-1935 (University of
Oklahoma Press, 1988), at 1 (“During the 1880s the United States committed itself to incorporating the
Indian population into the mainstream of American life. . . [N]ational leaders believed that the time had
arrived to make good on the centuries-old pledge to exchange native lands for “gifts of civilization” . . .
The Indian reform organizations of the 1880s thus dedicated themselves to devising a process whereby the
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history of the Phoenix Indian Industrial Boarding School is instructive of the
discriminatory treatment of American Indians in the Jim Crow Southwest. In 1889,
Indian Commissioner Thomas J. Morgan wrote: “[T]he Indians must conform to ‘the
white man’s ways,’ peaceably if they will, by force if they must.”181 Based on this
guiding principle, the Phoenix Indian Industrial Boarding School – colloquially
known as the Phoenix Indian School 182 – was established in Arizona in 1891 in order
to “educate” American Indians children by removing them from Indian reservations
in Arizona and “assimilate” them into the newly-settled White culture in the more
populous regions of the Arizona Territory.183
The Phoenix Indian School was run by the Bureau of Indian Affairs
(“BIA”), a federal government agency that is part of the Department of the
Interior.184 The BIA states that its mission is to “enhance the quality of life, to
promote economic opportunity, and to carry out the responsibility to protect and
improve the trust assets of American Indians, Indian tribes, and Alaska Natives.”185
Within the BIA is the Bureau of Indian Education (“BIE”), which states that its
mission is to:
Provide quality education opportunities from early childhood
through life in accordance with the tribes’ needs to cultural and
economic well being in keeping with the wide diversity of Indian
tribes and Alaska Native villages as distinct cultural and
governmental agencies. The Bureau considers the whole person
(spiritual, mental, physical and cultural aspects.186
Despite the stated missions of the BIA and BIE, federal agents in Arizona
wished to keep Native American children as far away as possible from their families
on the reservations so that their assimilation would be more complete. 187 Thus, it was
decided to put the Indian School in Arizona’s growing metropolis, Phoenix. Phoenix
was chosen as the location of Arizona’s Indian School for several reasons. First, it
was centrally located within the Arizona Territory, while also being sufficiently far
away from the many Indian reservations to ensure that the indoctrination of the
American Indian children would not be compromised. 188 Second, the residents of the
City of Phoenix saw the establishment of the Indian School as an opportunity for
their young, small town to benefit from cheap labor provided by the students of the
school and present other opportunities for economic growth that would benefit the
reservations might be slowly abolished and their residents assimilated.”).
181. See Trennert at 206.
182. In fact, Indian School Road is still a major thoroughfare in the City of Phoenix and
Maricopa County, Arizona. See Brad Hallart, “The History of the Street Names in Phoenix, Arizona: The
stories behind the street names,” available at http://www.bradhallart.com/phoenix_streets.htm (“Major
street. This road was named for the Phoenix Indian School, which opened on September 30, 1891, with an
enrollment of thirty-four Pima boys.”).
183. See Trennert at 12.
184. See U.S. Dep’t of The Interior, Indian Affairs, Who We Are” available at
www.bia.gov/whoweare/index.htm.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. The federal agents noted that, in their opinion, it was in the best interest of American
Indian children to be kept from their families and the reservations so that they did not “drop back into their
old filthy ways.” See Trennert at 14.
188. See Trennert at 11, 14-9.
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White settlers of the Arizona Territory. 189 Finally, by building the Indian School in
Phoenix, the BIA agents believed it would be easier to attract a school staff with a
“high degree of moral fitness” and a “positive religious character” that would assist
them not only in eradicating American Indian culture, but also in diminishing the
ostensibly detrimental effects of the Arizona Territory’s Mexican heritage.190
The philosophy of the founders of the Phoenix Indian School, which was
that it was “cheaper to educate Indians than to kill them,” 191 was underscored by the
fact that the “education” provided to the American Indian children at the Phoenix
Indian School was seriously compromised by the conscripted labor of the children
for the benefit of the school itself. 192 Eventually, the pretense of providing the
American Indian children at the Phoenix Indian School with an academic education
was abandoned in favor of a completely “industrial” course of study, which prepared
the children for a lifetime of servitude as members of a permanent underclass. 193 The
view of the BIA was that American Indian children would not benefit from any
academic training and should receive vocational training because they “will have to
make their living by the ‘sweat of their brow,’ and not their brains.” 194 The
Superintendent stated that the goal of the Phoenix Indian School was to teach
students how to work, as “indolence” was perceived by the federal agents to be a
trait endemic to American Indians. 195 In fact, the official “Course of Study for Indian
Students” prepared by the superintendent focused on providing American Indian
children a practical, vocational education because of their supposed intellectual
189. At the time of the establishment of the Indian School, Phoenix had been in existence as a
settlement for 23 years, and had a population of around 3,000 people. The hope was that locating the
Indian School – a federal facility - in Phoenix would both increase property values for the White settlers
and provide them with the opportunity to put the Native American children to work in the fruit orchards
surrounding the city. An article in the Arizona Herald in 1892 stated that by building the Indian School in
Phoenix, “Maricopa County will soon have a number of educated and intelligent laborers, whose training
will be especially appreciated by the fruit growers.” See Trennert at 19-20, 32; see also Hispanic Historic
Property
Survey,
“Establishing
a
Community”
1870-1900,”
available
at
http://phoenix.gov/webcms/groups/internet/@inter/@dept/@dsd/documents/web_content/pdd_hp_pdf_00
044.pdf (listing the population of Phoenix in 1890 as 3,152)..
190. BIA agents were also concerned that American Indian children be shielded from the
growing influence of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. A report on the establishment of the
Indian School stated that “The Indians of Arizona, long under the tutelage of a Mexican Civilization, are
now exposed to the no less debauching influence of Mormonism. Now is the fit time for the Government
to render them its best service. This golden opportunity should not be allowed to pass unimproved.” See
Trennert at 15.
191. See Trennert at 22.
192. Students at the Indian School were forced to sew uniforms, do laundry, cook, and
engage in other routine maintenance at the facility. These duties, which were performed without
compensation described as “not equal to those paid to white people but . . . quite satisfactory to the
Indians,” often took precedence to the education that the children were supposed to be receiving while at
the school. See Trennert at 52.
193. In 1893, the administrator of the Phoenix Indian School stated that “In order to civilize,
to make good citizens of Indian youth, it is absolutely necessary that they be inspired with a strong desire
for better homes, better food, better clothing, etc., than they enjoy in their natural state, and that they be
qualified to obtain these things by their own exertions.” See Trennert at 34.
194. The Superintendent of the Indian School stated that forcing American Indian girls to
spend most of their time on housekeeping made them “true wom[e]n . . . From slouchy, dissatisfied girls,
the year produced neat, ladylike, agreeable young ladies, who are proud of exhibiting their achievements,
and who I feel have made significant strides toward civilization and the higher aim in life.” See Trennert at
47.
195. A slogan of the Phoenix Indian School was “Be a Phoenix student not a reservation
bum.” See Trennert at 112.
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limitations.196
While enrolled in the Phoenix Indian School, American Indian children
were initially required to speak only in English, and their native languages and
traditions were prohibited.197 Although later superintendents permitted American
Indian language and culture to be integrated into the curriculum in a limited manner,
this did not in any way undermine the federal government’s commitment to the “deIndianization” of American Indian students enrolled in the Phoenix Indian School. 198
The overarching goal of ushering the students from “savagery” into “civilization”
required students enrolled in the Phoenix Indian School to wear a school uniform,
and they were often separated from students who were members of their tribes so
that they would not be able to communicate with each other in their native
language.199 Several former students of the Phoenix Indian School describe the
environment as akin to a military institution, with a very regimented schedule and
regular inspections by school administrators.200
Even in the face of overt and unapologetic racism, the Phoenix Indian
School endured for most of the twentieth century, finally closing in 1990 after nearly
100 years of operation.201 While the Phoenix Indian School was certainly not a
unique form of institutionalized racism, its history of segregation and the use of its
existence to justify the limitations placed on educational and personal advancement
for American Indians in Arizona is another example of life for people of color in the
Jim Crow Southwest.
C. Voting in Jim Crow Arizona
Shortly after gaining statehood in 1912, the Arizona Legislature passed a
statute requiring that voters be able to “read the Constitution of the United States in
196. The emphasis on vocational training of American Indian students sought to prepare the
boys for careers as “farmers, . . . lumbermen, ditchers, miners, [and] railroad hands.” Girls were
encouraged to seek work as domestic servants. See Trennert at 95.
197. See Trennert at 46.
198. See Trennert at 115 (“The school . . . operated on the assumption that Indian children
needed strict discipline. The introduction of military-style routine—the forming of regular habit, that
mother of self-control, which distinguishes civilization from savagery”—therefore came immediately.
Permitted to retain their traditional clothing only long enough to have a photograph taken (which might
later be used to contrast with their “civilized” look), new pupils were issued a uniform, school clothes, and
work outfits, and were assigned a dormitory. Almost as rapidly, they were separated from friends and
fellow tribesmen to make it more difficult to speak their native tongue. Indeed, the first thing new arrivals
learned was to avoid using their own language, although, admitted one, “sometimes we forget and talk
Pima.”).
199. The harsh treatment of the American Indian students was justified by the school
administrators as necessary in order to “better” the lives of the children through forced assimilation. When
confronted for such tactics as nailing windows shut and bolting fire-escape doors, Superintendent Brown
stated that “[I]f we would lift a race from ignorance and disease, we must do many things which they do
not want done . . . We deal with a primitive race, with persons who often lack appreciation of the better
reasons of good behavior.” See Trennert at 188-9.
200. Former students of the Phoenix Indian School also state that corporal punishment and
other forms of discipline were often used to keep students in line. “Penalties . . . consisted of a stay in the
guardhouse, several days on bread and water, and various forms of ridicule.” The punishment for running
away from the school was greeted with the harshest punishments, including jail time for the boys. Repeat
male offenders sometimes had their hair shorn and were forced to wear dresses. See Trennert at 118-9,
126.
201. See Phoenix Indian School Park Executive Summary, July 1993, “History of the
Phoenix Indian School Property,” at 3 (“The federal government officially closed the school in 1990).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2440747

RISING ARIZONA MCR.KC (DO NOT DELETE)

126

BERKELEY LA RAZA LAW JOURNAL

5/22/2014 10:29 AM

[Vol. XX:nnn

the English language in such manner as to show he is neither prompted nor reciting
from memory, and to write his name.” 202 The limits on voting for persons of color in
Arizona would become progressively more restrictive over the years, as the state
sought to find ways to disenfranchise the non-White citizen population.
1.

Prohibitions on American Indian Voting in Arizona

Although American Indians were granted United States citizenship with the
passage of the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924,203 many of the western states with
large American Indian populations refused to grant suffrage to tribal members for
several decades.204 The exclusion of American Indians from the right to vote was
premised mainly on the argument that the federal government rather than the states
governed the tribes.205 In Arizona, American Indians were not granted the right to
vote until 1948, following the Supreme Court of Arizona’s decision in Harrison v.
Laveen.206 However, the exclusion was initially challenged in 1928 without success.
a.

Porter v. Hall207

The first case that sought to invalidate Arizona’s prohibition against
suffrage for American Indians was Porter v. Hall, which reached the Supreme Court
of Arizona in 1928.208 Peter H. Porter and Rudolph Johnson, members of the Pima
Indian Tribe that resided on the Gila River Indian Reservation, filed the case.209 They
filed a writ of mandamus directing the county recorder of Pinal County, in which the
Gila River Indian Reservation is located, to register them as voters in the county. 210
The county recorder refused to register Porter and Johnson as voters in Pinal County,
alleging that they were “exclusively subject to and under the jurisdiction of the law
and courts of the United States and the tribal customs of said Pima Tribe, and are not
subject to the laws or within the jurisdiction of the state of Arizona.”211
The Supreme Court of Arizona summarized the issues before them as
follows:

202. See Eric V. Meeks, Border Citizens: The Making of Indians, Mexicans, and Anglos in
Arizona, at 42 (The University of Texas Press; 2007).
203. See National Archives, “Act of June 2, 1924, which authorized the Secretary of the
Interior to issue certificates of citizenship to Indians,” available at http://www.archives.gov/historicaldocs/todays-doc/?dod-date=602.
204. As of 1938, seven states still had not extended voting rights to American Indians;
Arizona and New Mexico did not grant American Indians the right to vote until 1948. See Pease, supra
note 41.
205. In addition to the oversight of the tribes by the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
and the maintenance of their tribal memberships, the states that did not want to extend voting rights to
American Indians argued that they were not entitled to suffrage because Indians were exempt from real
estate taxes and lived on lands controlled by the federal government. See Id. (“Western states imposed
severe restrictions on American Indian voting that pertain to residence, competence, civilization, tax status
(meaning property owners), or in various combinations of these restrictions.”).
206. Harrison v. Laveen, 67 Ariz. 337 (Ariz. 1948).
207. Porter v. Hall, 34 Ariz. 308 (Ariz. 1928).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 313.
210. Id. at 311.
211. Id. at 312.
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First, is the Gila River Indian Reservation within the political and
governmental boundaries of the state of Arizona, so that a
residence thereon is a residence in the state of Arizona, within the
meaning of Section 2, article 7, of our Constitution? Second, are
persons of Indian race, under the conditions set forth in the
stipulation of facts as being those in which plaintiffs find
themselves, ‘under guardianship,’ within the meaning of the same
section?212
Section 2, article 7, of the Arizona Constitution limited the right to vote to
male and female citizens of the United States over the age of 21 who resided in the
state for at least one year preceding the election in question. 213 It also provided that
“no person under guardianship . . . shall be qualified to vote at any election.” 214 As to
the first question of residence, the Arizona Supreme Court relied on several United
States Supreme Court cases215 and its own prior decision in Territory v. Delinquent
Tax List216to hold “that all Indian reservations in Arizona are within the political and
governmental, as well as geographical, boundaries of the state . . . and not as a
territorial area withdrawn from the sovereignty of the state of Arizona. Plaintiffs,
therefore, under the stipulation of facts, are residents of the state of Arizona, within
the meaning of section 2, article 7.”217
Regarding the second question, however – whether Indians “under
guardianship within the meaning of the Arizona Constitution and, therefore,
prohibited from voting – the Supreme Court of Arizona held that “[i]t is the
undisputed law, laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States innumerable
times . . . to the present time, that all Indians are wards of the federal government,
and as such are entitled to the care and protection due from a guardian to his
ward.”218 Citing Cherokee Nation v. Georgia219 to support the proposition that
“Indians [are] not capable of handling their own affairs in competition with the
whites, if left free to do so,”220 the Arizona Supreme Court reaffirmed the Supreme
Court’s opinion that:
[The Indians’] relation to the United States resembles that of a
ward to his guardian. They look to our government for protection;
rely upon its kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief to their
wants; and address the President as their great father. 221
The Supreme Court of Arizona then goes on to cite the voluminous body of
212. Id. at 315.
213. 34 Ariz. 315
214. Id.
215. The Supreme Court of Arizona relied primarily on the United States Supreme Court
decisions in Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U.S. 476 (1878), Langford v. Monteith, 102 U.S. 145 (1880), and U.S.
v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881).
216. 3 Ariz. 302 (Ariz.Terr. 1891) (holding that “[i]n the absence of treaty or other express
exclusion, the reservation becomes part of the territory, subject, however, to the power of the general
government to make regulations respecting the Indians, etc.”).
217. See 34 Ariz. 321.
218. Id. at 325.
219. 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
220. 34 Ariz. 325.
221. Id. (citing Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. 1 (1831).).
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United States Supreme Court precedent characterizing American Indians as “weak[ ]
and helpless[ ],222 “a weak and dependent people, who have no written language and
are wholly unfamiliar with all the forms of legal expression.” 223 The Arizona
Supreme Court also invokes Congress’ plenary power 224 over “the welfare of the
rather helpless people concerned”225 and its duty to “protect them from spoliation” 226
to support its finding that the Indians in Arizona are “under guardianship” within the
meaning of the state constitution, relying once again on extensive precedent from the
United States Supreme Court that “such guardianship [is not] terminated by the
Indians becoming citizens of the United States or the state in which they live,” 227 and
that “[Indians] owe no allegiance to the states and receive no protection from
them.”228 Therefore, the Arizona Supreme Court concluded that:
[P]laintiffs have not been emancipated from their guardianship,
and to some extent, at least, are not subject to the laws of the state
of Arizona, in the same manner as are ordinary citizens . . . [S]o
long as the federal government insists that, notwithstanding their
citizenship, their responsibility under our law differs from that of
the ordinary citizen, and that they are, or may be, regulated by that
government, by virtue of its guardianship, in any manner different
from that which may be used in the regulation of white citizens,
they are, within the meaning of our constitutional provision,
‘persons under guardianship,’ and not entitled to vote. 229
Despite the paternalistic and racist legal analysis employed by the courts,
this interpretation of the Arizona Constitution disenfranchising American Indians
would stand for another twenty years until, in 1948, the Arizona Supreme Court
overturned Porter with its unanimous decision in Harrison and Austin v. Laveen.
b.

Harrison and Austin v. Laveen

The first sentence of the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in Harrison and
Austin v. Laveen, written by Judge Levi S. Udall,230 reads:
The right of American Indians to vote in Arizona elections for state
and federal officers has after two decades again arisen, like
Banquo’s ghost, to challenge us.231
Again addressing whether American Indians were “under guardianship”

222. U.S. v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384(1886).
223. Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899).
224. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); see also Tiger v. Western Inv. Co.,
221 U.S. 286 (1911).
225. U.S. ex rel. West v. Hitchcock, 205 U.S. 80, 85 (1907).
226. U.S. v. Osage County, 251 U.S. 128, 133 (1919).
227. Winton v. Amos, 255 U.S. 373, 392 (1921).
228. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 384.
229. Porter at 330-2.
230. The Udalls are a prominent Arizona political family. See Arizona Stories: The Udall
Family, Eight/KAET Public Broadcasting Service, Arizona State University, available at
http://www.azpbs.org/arizonastories/ppedetail.php?id=82.
231. 67 Ariz. 340.
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within the meaning of section 2, article 7 of the Arizona Constitution, Judge Udall
stated that “we must determine whether such denial of the franchise to plaintiffs
violates the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States.”232
In answering this question, the specter of unequal protection under the law
for American Indians through the denial of suffrage clearly haunted Judge Udall.
Speaking for the entire Court in striking down the decision in Porter, Judge Udall
stated:
We have . . . no hesitancy in re-examining and reconsidering the
correctness of the legal principles involved because the civil
liberties of our oldest and largest minority group (11.5% of State’s
population) of whom 24,317 are over twenty-one years of age
(1940 U.S. Census) are involved, and it has ever been one of the
great responsibilities of supreme courts to protect the civil liberties
of the American people, of whatever race or nationality, against
encroachment.233
The characterization of American Indians’ right to vote as a civil liberties
issue – and the duty of the courts to “protect the civil liberties of the American
people, of whatever race or nationality, against encroachment” - marks a dramatic
shift from the portrayal of American Indians in the Porter decision as less-than-full
citizens of the United States.234
Judge Udall’s decision even cites Felix Cohen, a prominent Indian law
scholar, stating:
In a democracy, suffrage is the most basic civil right, since its
exercise is the chief means whereby other rights may be safeguarded. To deny the right to vote where one is legally entitled to
do so, is to do violence to the principles of freedom and equality. 235
Perhaps the most interesting part of Judge Udall’s opinion, however, is his
discussion of Professor N.D. Houghton’s article on Porter that appeared in the
California Law Review in 1930.236 Judge Udall notes that “[Professor Houghton]
clearly points out the greatest weakness in the [Porter] opinion, that is, that the court
largely based its decision upon the question of whether it was sound public policy to
permit Indians to vote rather than adhering . . . to applying the disqualifying
provisions of the law as written.”237 Professor Houghton observed that in Porter:
The majority of the court . . . [was] strongly affected by the
legitimate question as to whether it would be good public policy to

232. Id. at 341. The Court also considered the constitutionality of a corresponding Arizona
statute prohibiting suffrage for persons under guardianship, section 55-201.
233. Id. at 341. Judge Udall also notes in his opinion that according to the 1940 U.S. Census,
approximately one-sixth of all Indians in the United States resided in Arizona. See Id. at 344.
234. It should be noted, however, that despite his grand pronouncements concerning the civil
liberties of American Indians, Judge Udall nonetheless makes reference to “some of our more illiterate
and backward tribes, such as the neglected Navajos,” in his opinion. See Id.
235. Id. at 342.
236. 19 Cal. L. Rev. 507; 67 Ariz. 342.
237. 67 Ariz. 342.
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permit large numbers of tribal Indians living on reservations in the
state, and entirely immune from the laws and governmental
authority of the state . . . to participate in the formulation of state
governmental policy and the election of state and local officials.238
Professor Houghton further noted that Chief Justice Ross, who wrote a
dissenting opinion in Porter, believed that although “it might be possible that tribal
Indians on reservations ought not, as a matter of public policy, to be allowed to vote,
but he expressed the opinion that further legal or constitutional action was necessary
in Arizona in order legally to disqualify them.” 239
Judge Udall then writes for the Court:
Our view coincides with the late Chief Justice Ross that the matter
of determining what is “good public policy” is for the executive
and legislative departments and that the courts must base their
decisions on the law as it appears in the constitution and statutes.
We concede that very persuasive arguments may be advanced
upon both sides of the “public policy” question, but we refuse to be
drawn into the controversy as to the wisdom of granting suffrage to
the Indians, our sole concern being whether the constitution, fairly
interpreted, denies them the franchise.240
In undertaking this analysis, the Court held that it was “unable to find the
slightest evidence to indicate that the framers of our constitution, in specifying that
‘persons under guardianship’ . . . should be denied the right of franchise, thereby
intended that this phrase be applied to Indians as such . . . rather we feel, it is a
tortious construction by the judicial branch of the simple phrase ‘under
guardianship,’ accomplishing a purpose that was never designed by its framers.” 241
Finally, noting that “in the instant case the United States is appearing
specially in this litigation as amicus curiae to disclaim any intention to treat the
plaintiffs as ‘persons under guardianship,’” 242 the Court concluded that “to ascribe to
all Indians residing on reservations the quality of being ‘incapable of handling their
own affairs in an ordinary manner’ would be a grave injustice,” 243 and held that “the
term ‘persons under guardianship’ has no application to the plaintiffs or to the
Federal status of Indians in Arizona as a class. . . The majority opinion in the case of
Porter v. Hall is expressly overruled in so far as it conflicts with our present
holding.”244
Although the Arizona Supreme Court’s ruling in Harrison gave American
Indians suffrage in Arizona, it was unfortunately not the last time their right to
meaningfully exercise their vote would be challenged. 245 As discussed in the next
238. Id.
239. Id. (citing 19 Cal. L. Rev. at 518).
240. Id.
241. Id.at 345. The Court also opined that “[t]he same thing may be said as to the legislative
implementing enactment contained in section 55-201.”
242. Id. at 348.
243. 67 Ariz. 348.
244. Id. at 349.
245.
Discussed in depth in Part III: THE IMPACT OF JIM CROW ON MODERN
ARIZONA IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY. (discussing Arizona Inter-Tribal Council case)
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section, Arizona’s long history of racial-exclusion laws would continue to influence
the law and policy of the state and efforts to disenfranchise and marginalize people
of color. However, rather than attempting to single out individuals based explicitly
on race (which are likely unconstitutional), the laws now focused on restricting the
civil liberties of non-White people through a new vehicle that policymakers hoped
would be more likely to survive legal scrutiny: enforcement of immigration and
nationality law.

III.

THE IMPACT OF JIM CROW ON MODERN ARIZONA
IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY

The connection between Arizona’s history of race-based exclusion laws –
what I refer to in this Article as the “Jim Crow Southwest,” but what has been called
by others “Juan Crow,”246 – and modern Arizona’s hardline stance on immigration
law and policy may not be immediately apparent. However, upon closer
examination, it can be argued that Arizona’s relatively recent focus on the regulation
of noncitizens at the state level is an outgrowth of the race-based exclusion laws
historically targeting Latinos and American Indians in the state. The argument that
Arizona’s immigration laws are really race-based exclusion laws in disguise finds
support in the fact that the enforcement of laws attempting to regulate noncitizens in
Arizona has led to well-documented instances of racial profiling against people of
color, many of whom were lawful permanent residents or United States citizens. 247
The trumped-up enforcement of immigration law in the state of Arizona, then, has
largely been an end-run around the racially discriminatory laws of the past directed
at non-White persons, and has resulted in serious threats to the civil liberties of those
individuals.
A. The Chandler Round-Up
In the 1970s and 1980s, the State of Arizona, in particular the City of
Phoenix, experienced phenomenal population growth. 248 By the 1990s, the
demographics of the State of Arizona were also changing, with persons of Latino
heritage showing tremendous population growth in the state by 2003. 249 Although
Arizona has always had a large Latino and American Indian population, 250 and has
246. See, e.g., Diane McWhorter, The Strange Career of Juan Crow, THE NEW YORK TIMES,
June 16, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/opinion/sunday/no-sweet-homealabama.html?_r=0.
247.
Discussed in depth in Part III: THE IMPACT OF JIM CROW ON MODERN
ARIZONA IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY Section A. The Chandler Round-Up
248. See U.S. Census Bureau, Arizona Population of Counties by Decennial Census: 1900 to
1990, available at http://www.census.gov/population/cencounts/az190090.txt The State of Arizona, which
had less than 750,000 residents in 1950, saw its population surge to nearly 2 million by 1970, close to 3
million by 1980, and almost 4 million by 1990. The 2010 census revealed that Arizona’s current
population is more than 6 million people. See U.S. Census Bureau, “Arizona: State and County
QuickFacts,” available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/04000.html.
249. See Paul Luna, “Each of Us Has a Role,” at 41 (State of Latino Arizona, Arizona State
University, 2009) (noting that in 2003, 43% of the babies born in Arizona were Latino).
250. See U.S. Census Bureau, “Arizona – Race and Hispanic Origin: 1860 to 1990,” available
at http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0056/tab17.pdf . Currently, more than 5%
of the population in Arizona is of American Indian descent alone, compared to 1.2% of the United States
as a whole. See Arizona State and County Quick Facts.
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traditionally been politically conservative, the aging White population in Arizona
faced the certainty of becoming a statistical minority in the state of Arizona by
2050.251 This environment, coupled with the hysteria surrounding immigration law
enforcement and border security, made Arizona the perfect staging ground for a new
battle surrounding race-based law and policy in the American Southwest, starting
with the mass racial profiling of Latinos in the Phoenix suburb of Chandler in 1997.
Like other instances of race-based law enforcement in the Southwest, the
so-called “Chandler Round-Up” conducted in July 1997 was a cooperative effort
between the federal immigration authorities and local law enforcement in Arizona. 252
Named “Operation Restoration,”253 state and federal law enforcement officials
patrolled the City of Chandler on their bikes, stopping persons who appeared to be of
Latino descent and demanding identification and proof of United States
citizenship.254 Those individuals that could not provide proof of U.S. citizenship
immediately were arrested and detained on suspicion of being undocumented
immigrants.255 This led to the unlawful arrest and detention of United States citizens
and lawfully present immigrants on the basis of nothing more than their skin color,
and nearly 100 complaints were subsequently filed alleging civil rights violations by
the INS and local law enforcement.256 Subsequent investigations into the propriety of
the Chandler Round-Up revealed that all of the complainants were Latino, and that
no White persons were detained by law enforcement during the sting. 257
The Chandler Round-Up resulted in Congressional hearings regarding the
illegality of the tactics used by law enforcement to identify persons without legal
immigration status, as well as several civil rights lawsuits brought by United States
citizens and legal permanent residents were who racially profiled as undocumented
based on their perceived Latino heritage. 258 And, although the Congressional
hearings held several years later would refer to the Chandler Round-Up as “the only
major ethnic profiling incident actually related to immigration,” 259 the raids in
Chandler would turn out to be merely the beginning of race-based immigration law
enforcement in Arizona.
B. State and Local Enforcement of Immigration Law in Arizona
1.

SB 1070: Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods
Act

In April 2010, Arizona Governor Janice K. Brewer signed into law SB
251. See Arizona Department of Administration, Office of Employment and Population
Statistics,
2012-2050
State
and
County
Population
Projections,
available
at
http://www.workforce.az.gov/population-projections.aspx (demonstrating that by 2050, non-Hispanic
whites in Arizona will constitute 40% of the population and Hispanics of all races will make up 45% of
the population in Arizona).
252. See “Chandler Roundup: 10 Years After,” EAST VALLEY TRIBUNE, August 19, 2007,
available at http://www.eastvalleytribune.com/article_abd9d4ee-aef8-52f8-9cdd-a0839b330591.html.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Chandler Roundup: 10 Years After
259. Id.
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1070, also known as the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods
Act.260 Referred to as one of the “toughest immigration law in the country,” 261 SB
1070 is a statewide regulation of immigration that would give local law enforcement
throughout Arizona the ability – indeed, the responsibility – to detain persons whom
they have “reasonable suspicion” to believe may be in the country without
documents.262 The law also requires all persons to carry with them documents
regarding their immigration status, which apparently includes United States
citizens.263 This regulation has caused critics of SB 1070 to compare it to laws
passed in Germany’s Third Reich, 264 and has given rise to accusations that the law
will lead to racial profiling of Latinos and other persons of color that law
enforcement may believe “look” undocumented.265 The law was immediately
challenged in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona by the
United States Department of Justice as being preempted by federal immigration
law,266 and the majority of the law was enjoined and struck down on preemption
grounds by Judge Susan Ritchie Bolton in July 2010.267 After the affirmance of
Judge Bolton’s decision by a 2-1 panel of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit in April 2011,268 the State of Arizona petitioned the United
260.
See
Arizona
SB
1070,
available
at
http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/49leg/2r/bills/sb1070s.pdf.
261. See, e.g. Randal C. Archibald, “Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration,” THE
NEW
YORK
TIMES,
April
23,
2010,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/us/politics/24immig.html?_r=1&hp
(“[P]roponents and critics alike said [the Arizona law] was the broadest and strictest immigration measure
in generations.”)
262. See supra note 260
263. Id. Different interpretations of SB 1070 have reached different conclusions regarding
who must carry proof of citizenship with them under the Arizona law. Proponents of the law claim that
the Arizona law merely mirrors federal immigration law, which requires lawfully present aliens to carry
proof of their legal status with them at all times and to present such documents to immigration authorities
on demand. Opponents, however, point out that there is no law that requires U.S. citizens to carry proof of
citizenship with them or to present their citizenship documents to law enforcement, and argue that the
document provisions of SB 1070 will be unevenly and unfairly enforced against U.S. citizens of color.
See, e.g., John Merline, “Opinion Roundup: Ariz. Immigration Lawsuit’s Uncertain Future,” AOL NEWS,
July 7, 2010, available at http://www.aolnews.com/article/opinion-roundup-the-arizona-immigrationlawsuits-uncertain-fut/19545017 (quoting different experts opinions about the merits of SB 1070 and the
likelihood of success of the government’s legal challenge to the law).
264. See, e.g., Stephen Lemons, “Cardinal Roger Mahoney Compares SB 1070 to ‘German
Nazi and Russian Communist Techniques,” PHOENIX NEW TIMES, April 19, 2010, available at
http://blogs.phoenixnewtimes.com/bastard/2010/04/cardinal_roger_mahony_compares.php.
265. See, e.g., John Blackstone, “Will Arizona’s Law Lead to Racial Profiling? Law
Enforcement See Legislation as a Tool for Fighting Crime; Opponents Worry Measure Will Perpetuate
Racism,”
CBS
NEWS,
April
26,
2010,
available
at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/04/26/eveningnews/main6434594.shtml (expressing concerns that
United States citizens of Hispanic descent will be targeted for enforcement under the Arizona law
“because [they are] brown”).
266. Although the case would ultimately be the first to reach the United States Supreme
Court, the lawsuit filed by the Department of Justice was not the first challenge to S.B. 1070’s
constitutionality to be filed. Several challenges to the law – primarily on equal protection grounds – were
initially filed by various private individuals and civil rights groups, only to be consolidated and stayed
pending the resolution of the DOJ’s lawsuit. For the procedural history of all of the lawsuits filed
challenging S.B. 1070, see “Arizona S.B. 1070, Legal Challenges and Economic Realities,” American
Immigration
Council
Legal
Action
Center,
available
at
http://www.legalactioncenter.org/clearinghouse/litigation-issue-pages/arizona-legal-challenges.
267. U.S. v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010).
268. See Arizona v. U.S., 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011).
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States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari in August 2011.269 The Petition was
granted on December 12, 2011, and the Court heard oral argument on April 25,
2012.270
2.

U.S. v. Arizona

On June 25, 2012, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in
U.S. v. Arizona, striking down the majority of Arizona’s state immigration
enforcement law, S.B. 1070, in a 5-3 decision.271 The major provisions that the Court
determined were preempted by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) were
Section 3, Section 5(C), and Section 6.272 However, the Court let stand the most
controversial provision of S.B. 1070: Section 2(B), the so-called “show me your
papers” requirement.273 In allowing Section 2(B) to stand, the Court stated that “if
§2(B) only requires state officers to conduct a status check during the course of an
authorized, lawful detention or after a detainee has been released, the provision
likely would survive preemption.”274
The elephant in the room that the Court did not address in its decision in the
Arizona case was the racial profiling concerns that were raised by many observers,
including prominent lawyers and academics. 275 Although Justice Kennedy’s decision
leaves room for an as-applied challenge to S.B. 1070 should enforcement of the law
result in unconstitutional racial profiling of minorities, 276 the fact that the provision
was allowed to stand without so much as an acknowledgment by the Court that the
“reasonable suspicion” invites a racially disparate impact of the law on people of
color is troubling to those who believe the intent and design of the law is to
intimidate racial and ethnic minorities in Arizona. 277
3.

Arizona v. Inter-Tribal Council of Arizona

In 2004, the voters of Arizona overwhelmingly approved the ballot

269. See Arizona v. U.S., 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed, 2011 WL
3562633 (U.S. Aug. 8, 2011) (No. 11–182).
270. Arizona v. U.S., 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 845 (U.S. Dec.
12, 2011) (No. 11–182).
271. Arizona v. U.S., 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012). Only eight of the nine justices took part in
the decision, as Justice Elena Kagan recused herself from participation in the case.
272. Id. These sections dealt with alien registration documents, employment of aliens, and
probable cause arrest of aliens. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2928 (2011).
273. Section 2(B) requires Arizona law enforcement officers the duty to make a “reasonable
attempt . . . to determine the immigration status” of a person detained for a legitimate basis if “reasonable
suspicion exists that the person is an alien and is unlawfully present in the United States” and also
provides that “[a]ny person who is arrested shall have the person’s immigration status determined before
the person is released.” See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2012).
274. 132 S. Ct. 2509.
275. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, A Case Study of Color-Blind Rhetoric: The Racially
Disparate Impacts of Arizona’s S.B. 1070 and the Failure of Comprehensive Immigration Reform, J. FOR
SOC. JUST. 5, 18 (2011); see also See Lucas Guttentag, Arizona’s Immigration Law Violates Civil Rights.
Why Didn’t Anyone Mention That at the Supreme Court, NEW REPUBLIC, May 14, 2012,
http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/103188/sb1070-arizona-immigration-civil-rights-federalism.
276. Supra note 274.
277. See Johnson at 13-21 (discussing the disparate impact of S.B. 1070’s “reasonable
suspicion” clause on people of color and the propensity of the law to encourage racial profiling).supra
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initiative known as Proposition 200.278 Proposition 200 had a myriad of provisions
ostensibly aimed at preventing welfare fraud 279 and voter fraud by noncitizens.280
Although several portions of the law were challenged with varying degrees of
success, the voter identification provision of Proposition 200 was the most
controversial and resulted in the most protracted litigation, eventually reaching the
United States Supreme Court in 2013.281
Although the United States Supreme Court has upheld voter identification
laws in many states,282 the Arizona law was unique because of its requirement that
individuals present proof of United States citizenship in order to register to vote. 283
Proposition 200 required county recorders in the state of Arizona to “reject any
application for registration that is not accompanied by satisfactory evidence of
United States citizenship.”284 “Satisfactory evidence” of United States citizenship
within the meaning of the statute required:
(1) a photocopy of the applicant’s passport or birth certificate, (2) a
driver’s license number, if the license states that the issuing
authority verified the holder’s U.S. citizenship, (3) evidence of
naturalization, (4) tribal identification, or (5) ‘[o]ther documents or
methods of proof . . . established pursuant to the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986.285
In 2010, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that “Proposition 200’s
documentary proof of citizenship requirement conflicts with the [National Voter
Registration Act]’s text, structure, and purpose,” and enjoined the law as preempted
by the NVRA.286 The Ninth Circuit held that Arizona’s law was preempted because
the National Voter Registration Act of 1993287 requires states to “accept and use” a
uniform federal form to register voters for federal elections. 288 The en banc Court of
278. The proposition was formally known as the “Arizona Taxpayer and Citizen Protection
Act.” The initiative, as passed, amended §§ 16-152, 16-166 and 16-579 of the Arizona Revised Statutes by
adding A.R.S. § 46-140.01. See www.azsos.gov/election/2004/info/PubPamphlet/english/prop200.html
279. In addition to the voter identification requirement, Proposition 200 required state and
local agencies to determine the immigration status of applicants who applied for public benefits, made it a
misdemeanor for officials employed by such agencies for failing to report to authorities applicants who
could not prove their lawful immigration status, and also permitted a private right of action for
enforcement of this provision. See id.
280. Proposition 200 was intended to “combat voter fraud by requiring voters to present
proof of citizenship when they register to vote and to present identification when they vote on election
day.” See Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 2 (2006) (per curiam).
281. See Arizona v. Inter-Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247 (2013).
282. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (upholding
as constitutional Indiana state law requiring voters to present photo ID).
283. See 549 U.S. 2, Proposition 200 also required voter identification at the polling place.
See Arizona Secretary of State, 2004 Ballot Initiatives, Proposition 200, available at
https://www.azsos.gov/election/2004/Info/PubPamphlet/english/prop200.htm (“Proposition 200 requires
that prior to receiving a ballot at a polling place, a voter must present either one form of identification that
contains the name, address and photograph of the person or two different forms of identification that
contain the name and address of the person.”).
284. See A.R.S. § 16-166(F) (West Supp. 2012).
285. 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2252 (citing A.R.S. § 16-166(F)).
286. Gonzales v. Arizona, 624 F.3d 1162,1181 (2010).
287. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg et. seq.
288. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-4(a)(1). One of the stated purposes for enacting the NVRA, which
is colloquially referred to as the “Motor Voter Act” because of the provision that permitted people to
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Appeals reached the same conclusion in 2012,289 and the United States Supreme
Court granted the state of Arizona’s petition for a writ of certiorari shortly
thereafter.290
In determining whether Proposition 200 is preempted by the NVRA, the
Supreme Court first examined the Elections Clause, Art. I, § 4, cl. 1 of the United
States Constitution, which provides:
The Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elections for Senators
and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law
make or alter such Regulations, except as to the places of chusing
Senators.291
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Inter-Tribal Council of Arizona,
stated that “[t]he question here is whether the federal statutory requirement that
States ‘accept and use’ the Federal Form pre-empts Arizona’s state-law requirement
that officials ‘reject’ the application of a prospective voter who submits a completed
Federal Form unaccompanied by documentary evidence of citizenship.” 292
In answering this question, Justice Scalia summarized Arizona’s position as
“[t]he NVRA . . . requires merely that a State receive the Federal Form willingly and
use the form as one element in its . . . transaction with a prospective voter.” 293
However, the Court determined that “Arizona’s reading is . . . difficult to reconcile
with neighboring provisions of the NVRA.” 294 The Opinion continues:
Arizona’s reading would permit a State to demand of Federal Form
applicants every additional piece of information the State requires
on its state-specific form. If that is so, the Federal Form ceases to
perform any meaningful function, and would be a feeble means of
‘increas[ing] the number of eligible citizens who register to vote in
elections for Federal office. 295
Finally, after rejecting the state of Arizona’s argument to invoke the
presumption against preemption,296 the Court concludes that “the fairest reading of
the statute is that a state-imposed requirement of evidence of citizenship not required
by the Federal Form is ‘inconsistent with’ the NVRA’s mandate that States ‘accept
and use’ the Federal Form,”297 and held that “42 U.S.C. §1973gg-4 precludes
Arizona from requiring a Federal Form applicant to submit information beyond that
required by the form itself.” 298
register to vote when they obtain their state driver license, was to encourage persons from diverse racial
and socioeconomic populations to vote. See Raymond E. Wollfinger and Jonathan Hoffman, “Registering
and Voting with Motor Voter,” Political Science and Politics, American Science Association (2001).
289. Gonzales v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 403 (2012).
290. 568 U.S. __ (2012).
291. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
292. 133 S. Ct. 2251
293. Id. at 2254.
294. Id.
295. Id. (citing § 1973gg(b)).
296. Id. at 2256.
297. Id. at 2254. (citing Siebold, at 397).
298. Id. at 2260.
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The demise of Proposition 200’s proof of citizenship requirement seems, at
first blush, to be a victory for voting rights and a blow to voter suppression efforts
based on race and ethnicity in Arizona. However, several astute observers of the
Supreme Court and voting rights experts have noted that the Court’s decision to
strike down Proposition 200’s proof of citizenship provision may, in the end, be a
hollow victory.299 This is because, in the same term, the Supreme Court invalidated
Section 4 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as unconstitutional. 300 Section 4, which
permits Congress to identify regions of the country with a history of voter
suppression based on race and require the Department of Justice to pre-clear its
congressional districts under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 301 is a major tool in
the fight against the dilution of voters of color. 302 Notably, like many States in the
Jim Crow South, Arizona has been subject to pre-clearance by the DOJ under
Section 5 because of its long history of voter suppression of people of color. 303 Thus,
the practical effect – if any - of the Court’s decision in Inter-Tribal Council of
Arizona on the preservation of voting rights for people of color in Arizona to be
seen.

IV.

CONCLUSION

More than perhaps any other state in the last decade, the state of Arizona
has distinguished itself nationally, for better or for worse, as the state at the forefront
of the immigration battle in the United States. Because it shares a heavily-trafficked
border with Mexico, Arizona has become both literally and figuratively “ground
zero” for the debate over the development of immigration law and policy in the
twenty-first century.304 However, the question frequently arises: why Arizona? What
about Arizona’s history and culture, as opposed to other border states with
substantial non-White and noncitizen populations such as New Mexico and Texas,
makes it particularly hostile to people of color generally and immigrants in
particular?
This Article has attempted to shed light on the long and complicated history
of race relations in Arizona, and demonstrate the link between modern immigration
law and policy in the state and its history of race-based exclusion laws targeted at
non-White persons. Since pre-statehood, Arizona has been a bastion of the Jim Crow
Southwest, passing laws that restricted the rights of non-White persons to marry,
vote, and participate fully in society as citizens and residents of the United States.
Because of Congress’ plenary power over noncitizens, and the resulting restrictions
on their rights and privileges in the context of the right to remain in the United

299. See, e.g., Brad Plumer, The Supreme Court’s Decision on Arizona Won’t Put an End to
Voting
Wars,
THE
WASHINGTON
POST,
June
17,
2013,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/06/17/the-supreme-courts-decision-on-arizonawont-put-an-end-to-voting-wars/.
300. See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. See, e.g., Michael White, “Arizona is Immigration Debate Ground Zero With Hispanics
Rising,” BLOOMBERG, March 22, 2011, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-0322/arizona-is-immigration-debate-s-ground-zero-with-hispanic-majority-in-view.html.
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States, modern Arizona has focused on the enforcement of immigration law as a way
to attempt to intimidate, harass, and restrict the rights of non-White persons in the
state.
More than one hundred years after first gaining statehood, Arizona remains
a place that is strongly influenced by its history of war, genocide, colonization, and
racism. While the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Arizona v. United States has
placed a temporary damper on its attempt to make “attrition through enforcement”
the law of the state, history shows that the Arizona legislature has been both creative
and persistent in its attempt to ensure that the power of non-Whites in the state is
diluted as much as possible. However, the effects of the Jim Crow Southwest on
modern immigration law and policy in Arizona are apparent, and whether and how
the state of Arizona will evolve into a place that embraces and respects its rich
history and diversity remains to be seen.
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